Since the mid-19th century, Tonga has been a constitutional monarchy, or what legal scholar Guy Powles once called ‘a constitution under a monarchy’. Its 1875 foundational law formalised the King’s control over cabinet, whose ministers sat unelected in parliament alongside equal numbers of nobles and popularly elected People’s Representatives. The reforms in 2010 saw the Monarch give up the right to choose both the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The amended Constitution gives Cabinet ‘executive authority’ and makes Cabinet ‘collectively responsible to the legislative assembly’, but it also defines the term ‘executive authority’ to ‘exclude […] all powers vested in the King or the King in Council, whether by this Constitution, or any Act of the Legislative Assembly, any subordinate legislation, and Royal Prerogatives’. It left the King not only with powers of dissolution of parliament and with a veto over legislation, but also over appointments to the judiciary. Even the government’s own legal advisor, the Attorney-General, remained royally appointed. The 2014 Pursglove report concluded that the amended Constitution ‘can lay claim to being the most poorly structured and drafted Constitution of any Country in the Commonwealth.

Since the current Monarch ascended to the throne in 2012, even ceremonial powers have been hardened. The King and his Privy Council chose Tonga’s anti-corruption commissioner in 2024, its police commissioner in May 2025, and the chairman of its Electoral Commission in 2016. The Privy Council, where the King once sat with ministers, survived after the 2010 transition but now separated from cabinet, as a shadowy institution of dual power which leaves functionaries in the ministries uncertain of lines of executive authority. As Pursglove warned, ‘while the Ministry of Justice remains accountable to the people through Parliament, the Office of the Lord Chancellor and the Office of the Attorney-General are not publicly accountable and answer only to the King in Privy Council. This is contrary to the democratic principles upon which the new Constitution was founded’.

Tonga’s nobles are sometimes compared to European feudal lords or a landed aristocracy, but in fact they are beholden to the King. In the 19th century, King Tupou I defeated the rival dynasties of the Tu’iTonga and Tu’i Ha’atakulaua and abolished the old noble titles replacing them with a smaller group of hand-picked nobles whose loyalty is to the Tupou dynasty. What Lord Vaea sees as a resurgence of aristocratic leadership is therefore really a reassertion of royal power.

This is not the first time that a noble has assumed the prime ministerial portfolio since the constitutional amendments 15 years ago. Owing to the reconfiguration of parliament in 2010, popularly elected MPs had the potential to obtain control over government, … if only they could remain united. They did not. Despite the then King, George Tupou V, indicating a preference for a peoples’ representative to head the government, a noble Lord Tu’ivakanō, defeated Pōhiva in the first post-reform prime ministerial election by 14 votes to 12.

After he acceded to the throne in 2012, King Tupou VI refused to accept a merely ceremonial figurehead role. Pōhiva managed to become Prime Minister in 2014 by 15 votes to 11 with all of the nine noble MPs arrayed against him. The King subsequently pushed back against the democratic reforms introduced by his eccentric elder brother, particularly with regards to powers to ratify international treaties. In 2017, angered by his troubled relationship with the Prime Minister who he accused of ‘trespassing’ on royal authority, the King prematurely dissolved parliament. He was acting on the advice of the Speaker, Lord Tu’ivakano, who highlighted alleged government encroachment on royal prerogatives. It proved a rude awakening. Pōhiva’s Democratic Party was returned with an increased majority at the November 2017 polls, acquiring 14 of the 17 popularly elected posts. The defiant Pōhiva was triumphantly re-elected as Prime Minister, but he soon fell ill and died in office in September 2019.

Ever since, at least until now, Tonga’s Prime Ministers have been Peoples’ Representatives, but they have been required to pay ever more homage to the palace. After Pōhiva’s death, the former Minister of Finance Pōhiva Tu’i’onetoa assumed the prime ministerial portfolio, but he became a vigorous opponent of the pro-democracy faction, accusing them of seeking to dethrone the King. The reassertion of royal powers has been particularly striking feature of the 2021-25 parliamentary term. In the wake of the 2021 general election, Huakavameliku Siaosi Sovaleni was appointed as Prime Minister, this time with majority backing from the popularly elected MPs and with his main rival, former finance minister ‘Aisake Eke, aligned with the nobles bloc.

Sovaleni’s relations with the King soon deteriorated. In February 2024, King Tupou VI announced that he was withdrawing ‘confidence and consent’ from the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defence, leading the elected government to spend the rest of that year trying in vain to heal the rift with the palace. Sovaleni resigned as Prime Minister in December 2024 to avoid being ousted in a no-confidence vote, which had the backing of the King. He was replaced by the obsequious ‘Aisake Eke, who managed to cultivate closer relations with the palace than his predecessor. It was he who initially appointed the King’s son, Crown Prince Tupouto‘a ‘Ulukalala, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence and passed legislation to transform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into ‘his Majesty’s Diplomatic Service’. This was apparently not enough to earn him the King’s favour to serve another term.

The new government will face challenges both on the economic and political fronts. Tonga’s economy relies heavily on remittances from migrants overseas, which are equivalent to around 44% of gross domestic product, and which held up strongly during the covid-19 pandemic. But these are dependent on continued outward migration, with implications for the domestic economy. Tonga owes China US$120 million, equivalent to around a quarter of annual gross domestic product. Having discharged little of that debt since the Chinese loans were first taken out in 2008, repayments have ballooned to around $US20 million per annum in 2024-25, more than the island kingdom spends on health services. To obtain funds to sustain social services, government has become even more reliant on foreign aid.

The Lord Fakafanua-led government is on the lookout for lucrative new sources of income from overseas, such as citizenship-by-investment schemes or passport sales. In the 1980s and 1990s, royal-appointed governments lost large sums of money in corruption scandals associated with these secretly approved schemes. It was a reaction to the lack of accountability and transparency under those governments that initially sparked Tonga’s democracy movement. Tonga’s long-suffering citizens may be faced with the uncomfortable choice of either tolerating similar indiscretions or rebuilding that movement.

Table 1: Results of the Solomon Islands 2024 Election

Ownership, Unity & Responsibility Party	15
Solomon Islands Democratic Party	11
United Party	6
People First Party	3
Solomon Islands Party for Rural Advancement	1
Iumi for Change	1
Kadere	1
Democratic Alliance Party	1
Independents	11
Total	50

Source: https://solomonelections.net/results.

The Solomon Islands comprises a double-chain of forest-covered high volcanic islands, fringed by outlying smaller atolls and raised coral islands. It is located to the east of Papua New Guinea and to the north of Australia. The country has a population of 761,000, of whom around 13% inhabit the capital, Honiara, located on the island of Guadalcanal. The Pacific Island State was a British protectorate from 1893 until 1978 and became a major theatre of conflict during the Pacific War. Since independence, the Solomon Islands has relied on a first-past-the-post electoral system which is presently used in 50 single-member districts. A Governor-General is the representative of the Head of State (the British Queen), and the country remains a member of the Commonwealth. Political parties are normally of limited significance during election campaigns, outcomes of which are largely driven by personal or kinship loyalties. Factional alliances become more important during the post-election contest for the Prime Ministerial portfolio. After elections, MPs habitually travel from outlying constituencies to join ‘camps’ in the capital, Honiara, normally located at the major international hotels. After the April 2024 election, Sogavare’s OUR Party set up their camp at the Cowboy’s Grill, a restaurant in eastern Honiara, while the opposition CARE coalition, linking Wale’s SIDP and Rick Hounipwela’s Democratic Alliance Party, established their rival headquarters at the Heritage Park Hotel close to the town centre.

The April election was the first since the Solomon Islands switched its diplomatic links from Taiwan to China in 2019, and then signed a security deal with Beijing in April 2022. That deal provoked considerable anxiety in Australia, which at the time was in the midst of a federal election campaign. A leaked draft of that security arrangement gives the Chinese navy the right (with the consent of the Solomon Islands Government) to ‘make ship visits’ and gives Chinese police and riot police the ability (at the Solomon Islands’ request) ‘to protect the safety of Chinese personnel and major projects’ . With some election campaign-driven exaggeration, then Australian opposition foreign affairs spokesperson Penny Wong (now Australian foreign minister) at the time called the Solomon Islands-China security deal ‘the worst foreign policy blunder in the Pacific since the end of World War II’ . The Solomon Islands’ relationship with China likewise provoked attention in the United States. In mid-2019, United States Vice-President Mike Pence put considerable pressure on the Solomon Islands to retain its ties with Taiwan. After the 2019 switch, Washington endorsed a SCALE aid program for agriculture on the island of Malaita, where the provincial government remained firmly opposed the diplomatic switch to China. Despite a great recent emphasis on American re-engagement with the region, culminating in President Biden’s September 2022 announcement of a US$810 million package to counter Chinese expansion in the Pacific, the SCALE Program was wound down ahead of the 2024 election. 

Figure 1: Incumbents Re-contesting in 2024

Notes: SIDP is Solomon Islands Democratic Party, OUR is Ownership Unity and Responsibility Party, UP is United Party, PF is Peoples First Party, DA is Democratic Alliance Party.

Although the 2019-24 Prime Minister Sogavare signed the China security agreement, he insisted that Australia remained his country’s ‘security partner of choice’. Sogavare defended a wider ‘friends to all, enemies to none’ foreign policy and promised major gains in economic development and trade arising from the new alliance with China. Contrary to numerous Australian media reports, he denied that the security pact would allow a Chinese naval base to be constructed in the Solomon Islands. Over 2022 and 2023, the Australian and Chinese governments competed via donations of equipment, either firearms, vehicles or water cannons, to the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. Ahead of the April election, Australia renewed its commitment to deliver security assistance via a Solomon Islands Assistance Force (SIAF), a policing arrangement arranged under a bilateral security treaty signed in 2017 which entailed Australian police being deployed to counter riots in the capital in 2019 and 2021. Geo-political rivalries became a major focus of the election campaign, with some opposition MPs promising to jettison the China security deal and restore diplomatic links with Taiwan. Encouraged by Russian and Chinese media commentary, Sogavare claimed that the United States and Australia were seeking to undermine his re-election campaign. In his East Choiseul constituency, which has long been a fairly safe seat, Sogavare faced a major challenge from David Qurusu, winning by only 1,808 votes to Qurusu’s 1,549, a closeness which the outgoing Prime Minister explained by ‘extensive efforts by the United States to influence the outcome’ with the evidence being ‘clear displays of the United States’ flag’. During the post-election period, too, there was a front page media claim in the Solomon Star that US and New Zealand diplomats were aligned with the opposition in an effort to topple the Sogavare government. These allegations were strongly denied by both New Zealand and the United States.

Figure 2: Solomon Islands Log Production & Exports, 2011-2023

Source: Central Bank of the Solomon Islands Quarterly Review.

Cleavages around foreign policy may have animated the political elites, but there is little evidence that they influenced electoral results out in the rural constituencies. Policy issues tend not to be decisive in Melanesian election campaigns, and foreign policy issues even less so. Campaigns instead typically focus on personal loyalties or the extent of patronage, including expenditure of Rural Constituency Development Funds (RCDFs, ie funds disbursed by individual MPs). OUR party incumbents may have fared poorly at the 2024 polls, but Wale’s SIDP – which was critical of the break with Taiwan – also saw 40% of its sitting MPs lose their seats (see Figure 1). OUR Party incumbents did not poll particularly badly on Malaita, despite the provincial government on that island having held out against the switch to China after 2019. One result at the provincial level, which saw simultaneous elections on 17 April 2024, did appear to indicate support for the pro-Taiwan position. The former Premier of Malaita Province, Daniel Suidani, had fought a long-running battle with the national government over 2019-2023, until he was ousted in a national government-sponsored no confidence ballot on the floor of the provincial assembly in February 2023. He was re-elected on 17 April. However, his new Iumi for Change Party (‘You and me for Change’) only secured a single seat at the national level and the constituency-level victor in his broader Fataleka constituency on Malaita is from the ruling OUR Party. 

The influence of the China switch on the April 2024 election was indirect. OUR Party campaign rallies around the country were well-financed, particularly for the more prominent candidates such as former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, Party President Jimson Tanagada and East Guadalcanal MP Bradley Tovosia (other OUR incumbents ran much more sparse campaigns). At launches, Sogavare’s speeches typically extolled the virtues of the new China alliance as having delivered sizable developmental gains in road- and bridge-building, and other infrastructure assistance. These claims sat uneasily alongside a sharp contraction in GDP over the years preceding the election. According to both the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, GDP declined by over 8% in 2020-22, with only a weak recovery fuelled by running the Pacific Games in late 2023. For decades, round log exports have been the Solomon Islands’ critical source of foreign exchange, but since 2018 the log export industry has witnessed a steep downturn, largely due to a decline in the Chinese real estate market and the associated building contraction. Whether measured in value or volume terms, log exports were less than half their 2018 levels in 2023 (see Figure 2). Despite high profile grant-funded projects, such as the stadium built by China in central Honiara for the 2023 Pacific Games, Chinese firms have so far been unable to find plentiful opportunities for lucrative concessional loan-financed commercial schemes analogous to those attracting the belt and road initiative projects seen in Southeast Asia or Africa.  

Other factors that damaged former Prime Minister Sogavare’s bid for a fifth term included revelations by the US-funded Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) that his expensive real estate deals in Honiara could not have been funded by his prime ministerial salary. During the 2003-17 period, when the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was in the country, Sogavare acquired considerable support both in the Honiara political elite and among those poorer predominantly Malaitan town dwellers who inhabit squatter settlements in the capital, as a ‘nationalist’ leader prepared to stand up against what was widely perceived as Australian intrusiveness. Much has changed since. Riots followed Sogavare’s election as Prime Minister in 2019. Further major riots broke out in November 2021, triggered by Malaitan protest over the country’s diplomatic switch from Taiwan to China. During those disturbances, rioters targeted the Prime Minister’s dwelling in eastern Honiara (which was what encouraged him to seek a policing deal with China). Sogavare’s 2023 move to amend the Constitution to give himself an extra seven months in office, on the pretext that elections could not be held simultaneously with the Pacific Games, was also unpopular. In tandem with declining urban popularity, Sogavare became increasingly dependent on his ties to China. In late 2021, the Sogavare-led government survived a ‘no-confidence’ challenge on the floor of parliament, buttressed by support from Beijing. 

Numerous court cases typically follow general elections in the Solomon Islands, with that number reaching 25 of the 50 contests following the 2024 polls. Most of these cases allege bribery or treating. Where successful, single-seat by-elections will be held. Matthew Wale, Manele’s rival for the top job, has also contested the legality of the prime ministerial election, claiming that the timeframe for nominations was insufficient. Wale himself was accused of financial irregularities ahead of the 2024 election, through offering to pay rivals not to contest in his Aoke-Langalanga constituency. The OCCRP revealed evidence that together with the Chinese firm Win Win, East Guadalcanal MP Bradley Tovosia had used RCDF money to construct a ‘road to nowhere’ that travelled 20 kilometres into the interior of his constituency, before halting, amidst speculation that the Chinese firm’s motive was to prospect for minerals. One novel allegation of irregularities, ahead of the election, was OUR Party’s criticism of the Solomon Islands Electoral Commission for allegedly seeking to sway candidates against incumbents by use of advertising text messages such as ‘You are never too little to make a CHANGE. The Power is in Your Two Votes. People with Disabilities, Women, Young People, Everyone. April 17 – Make that CHANGE’.  

Major scalps at the 2024 election included the defeats of former 2010-11 Prime Minister Danny Philip, two-term East Honiara MP Douglas Ete, and three-term Gao-Bugotu MP Samuel Manetoali. After two terms out of parliament, 2011-14 Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo made a comeback as an MP, but no longer contesting his former Gizo-Kolombangara constituency in the west. Instead, he successfully campaigned for the Central Honiara constituency, correctly calculating that the incumbent would be unable to retain his seat. Three women were elected at the national level (6%), and an additional five (8%) to the provincial assemblies. Turnout across the country was 82.3% of registered voters, slightly below the 86.4% at the 2019 election. In the past, turnout has been lower because voters in the urban centres tended to register twice: once in their place of residence and once in their home districts, although they normally only recorded a single vote (as controlled by the inking of the finger). Ahead of general elections, many Solomon Islanders throng to the Honiara docks to travel to their home areas. At the 2014 election, biometric voter registration was introduced for the first time, which has greatly diminished the extent of duplicate registration. Some duplicate registrations continued thereafter, but biometric voter registration made it easier to identify these.   

Independents fared well at the election of 2024, taking eleven of the 50 seats. Yet, historically, so-called ‘independents’ have fared better still, accounting for 21 of the 50 seats at the previous election in 2019 and 32 of the total seats at the 2014 polls. Independents are better described as unaffiliated, or as-yet-unaffiliated MPs, rather than MPs who are ideologically neutral with respect to the platforms of the major parties (which are, in any case, barely distinguishable on most issues). So-called independents are typically, but not always, first-time MPs. They tend to join the established factions shortly after general elections or else to run as shadow candidates ready to step up if a long-serving incumbent falters. The number of so-called ‘independents’ has been influenced by the passage of the 2014 Political Parties Integrity Act, although that law has not noticeably strengthened political parties. Wale’s SIDP fared better than all of the other parties in securing new first-time MPs: seven of its eleven MPs were newcomers, either first-timers or in one case a temporarily absent returning MP. The SIDP did particularly well in the west, sweeping up the three New Georgia seats, and in the extreme eastern Temotu province, where the party obtained two seats. Yet it was the OUR Party that was most able to attract the waverers during the post-election prime ministerial contest, with ten of the eleven independents joining the Cowboy’s Grill camp in eastern Honiara. 

In the wake of past general elections, the outcome of the prime ministerial contest has been highly uncertain. In the days running up to those elections, side-switching has typically been common, even to the extent of even changing the coalition in pole position to form a government. By contrast, the camps into which the bulk of the politicians divided themselves in 2024 resembled the pre-election alliances, and there was little change thereafter. Fewer independents strengthened the position of OUR Party at the Cowboy’s Grill and the CARE coalition at the Heritage Park, particularly after Peter Kenilorea’s United Party predictably joined the Heritage Park camp. Peter Kenilorea, son of the country’s first post-independence Prime Minister and later long-serving Speaker of Parliament of the same name, was himself a potential candidate for the prime ministerial portfolio. So too was 2011-14 Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo, who set up a separate camp at the Honiara Hotel, but failed in his effort to persuade the Heritage Park camp to promise him the finance ministry and deputy prime ministership. It was Wale’s name that went forward to the Governor General as the Heritage Park camp’s nominee for the prime ministerial portfolio, raising familiar cries about ‘Malaitan dominance’ in government (since both the Governor General and Matthew Wale are from Malaita, as is Peter Kenilorea). However, even before the submission of those nomination papers it was clear that OUR Party had managed to attract sufficient so-called independents to form the next government. 

With Jeremiah Manele now at the helm as Prime Minister, the Solomon Islands is likely to improve its relationship with Australia and other traditional partners, but cabinet remains strongly supportive of the alliance with China. Most of the core ministers are the same as those in the 2014-19 government, although the so-called ‘independent’ MPs have also been accommodated. Manele was a career diplomat and civil servant before he entered politics. In 2014, he was aligned with the opposition. After joining the government, he played an important role after the 2019 polls in brokering the diplomatic switch to China, before becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs. Since becoming Prime Minister, Manele has reaffirmed support for the ‘friends to all, enemies to none’ foreign policy. His election was welcomed by the Global Times, the Chinese government’s mouthpiece, as representing ‘the broad voice of Pacific Islanders seeking to continue mutually beneficial cooperation with China’. Sogavare remains in cabinet as Minister of Finance, although the Deputy Prime Minister portfolio went instead to Bradley Tovosia. As is usual in Melanesian politics, government has initially strengthened since its election. Typically, the opposition benches in Melanesia swell towards the mid-term. Like so many of his predecessors, Manele will face difficulties holding together a fractious governing coalition, particularly given the simultaneously challenging economic and fiscal situation. 

The Solomon Islands 2024 election was one in which an incumbent Prime Minister, and his cabinet, staked everything – including their re-election prospects, the likelihood of political stability, and the economic development of their nation – on the new alliance with China. The outcome of that election indicates that the country’s long-run difficulties – political instability, the threat of urban violence and the absence of sufficient economic ventures to absorb the under-employed – have not been addressed and cannot be resolved by shifts in foreign policy alone.  

While the danger of industrial espionage in companies is widely known and information security is recognized as a necessary measure, the phenomenon of espionage in the field of science was hardly addressed until a few years ago. In those cases where it was addressed, it was understood in terms of research competition: the researcher who was able to publish research findings first was seen as their author – regardless of whether they had obtained the findings illegitimately. In recent years, however, the topic of scientific espionage has been more widely discussed (especially in the USA and Australia) and it has been recognized that espionage is not only carried out by individual researchers to accelerate their careers, but also on behalf of the state.

However, the discourse on this topic is confronted with three major problems: scientific espionage is challenging to grasp conceptually, hard to detect, and often operates in a legal gray area. Questions arise about what constitutes legitimate sharing of research results, what might be potentially illegitimate but not illegal information acquisition, and how this relates to espionage on behalf of a foreign state. These unresolved issues lead to a low awareness of risks and a high undisclosed number of incidents.

In a time of global power struggles, it is not surprising that powerful nations aim to strengthen their position in the global political system. In the competition for dominance, nations also resort to scientific espionage, aiming to capture innovations, undermine sanctions and export controls, and shift the financial risks of research and development onto others. China is not the only actor using scientific espionage for these purposes, but it currently leads in terms of the efforts to obtain and the scope of collected data. Even Russia and North Korea, known for comprehensive espionage activities, currently do not concentrate resources on espionage as targeted as China does. China’s scientific espionage activities can be closely linked to its strategic ambition to become the new world power by its 100th anniversary.

In most cases, scientific espionage is focused on dual-use research areas. In science, “dual use” refers to civilian research with a dual, namely military, purpose. In some fields of research, the dual-use-aspect is obvious, such as biochemistry, which is beneficial to human health but can also be used for chemical warfare agents. Or think of rocket technology, which enables us to explore space but can also be used for weapons. Dual-Use also includes areas that appear “neutral” at first glance, such as findings from materials research, nanotechnology, robotics, quantum technology and many more. These potentially affected research areas are regulated by export controls in most countries. However, the types of control regimes use are not sufficient to counter the dangers posed by scientific espionage. The decision on whether something falls into the dual-use category or not remains dependent on the assessment within research institutions. The responsibility for assessing the risks of research in a dual-use context is often delegated to individual researchers, who find themselves in an unresolved conflict: protecting sensitive research results while adhering to the ideal of research freedom, and facing individual motivations, such as promoting international collaboration for prestige, financial incentives, or better career opportunities.

Measures to protect research results are often considered contradictory to research freedom. However, the ideal of a free knowledge market has little evidence when closely examined. Research freedom is constrained by cultural practices, institutional regulations, and external pressures. It is obvious that the freedom of research is also influenced by the funding bodies (such as industry), which determine what research is carried out through their funding. The fragility of the ideal of research freedom is evident in scientific collaborations between Western countries and China. Two fundamentally different political and cultural systems with partly antagonistic value systems collide. While Western countries like Germany and Australia emphasize democracy, the rule of law, and the principle of research freedom, the scientific sector in autocratic China is closely intertwined with the state and the Communist Party. This is reflected in the hierarchical organization of leadership bodies at Chinese universities, where – unlike in Western countries – the party chief ranks higher in the hierarchy than the academic leader. This ensures that the research institution aligns with the party’s agenda. The strategy paper of the Communist Party known as “Document No. 9”, which was leaked in 2013, revealed that universal Western values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights are vehemently rejected by the CCP. This attitude also affects the Academic Freedom Index of the country, with China ranking among the worst ten percent in 2023 (see figure 1)

Figure 1: Academic Freedom Index Map

The need for financial resources compels research institutions to look for financially potent partners. This can undermine research freedom, as evident in Europe and Australia, especially considering that foreign investments inherently carry the potential for “foreign influence.” In the West, awareness of foreign influence, particularly with a focus on China, is growing and is sometimes even referred to as a central societal challenge of the 21st century. Simultaneously, there is a warning not to let the discussion devolve into xenophobia.

Regardless of whether one speaks of “foreign influence” or “scientific espionage”, research institutions and universities are often easy targets. The lack of awareness among individuals, the uncertainty about what knowledge is worth protecting, and the absence of a holistic security concept for protecting research results facilitate the work of so-called “non-traditional collectors” – students and visiting scholars from China who gather information deemed relevant by the People’s Republic during their professional activities.

Herein lies the dilemma, a tension between progress and security. Consequently, international research collaboration is also referred to as a double-edged sword: it is indispensable to keep a nation at the forefront of time, but it can also become a gateway for espionage.Scientific espionage not only leads to unfair competition, job losses, and weakening national security but can also have geopolitical consequences if one thinks of the military build-up in China and the current conflict between the People’s Republic and Taiwan. Moreover, research institutions affected by espionage face reputation damage and the loss of trust from society and sponsors. This dilemma needs resolution.

In the 2022-initiated study “Research institutions between the poles of freedom of research and protection of knowledge. Scientific espionage using the example of China”, the question was examined of how research institutions can protect themselves from scientific espionage. Using expert interviews, the study investigated how research institutions in Austria overcome the tension between protection against scientific espionage and the necessity of scientific exchange. The interviewees included individuals from the research sector, as well as experts from security authorities and intelligence services. Through qualitative research methodology, an inventory was generated, and recommendations were derived.

Similar to Sabine Carl’s findings for Germany in 2019, awareness of scientific espionage in research institutions in Austria was very low. Since risk awareness is a prerequisite for all subsequent measures, sensitization should occur at the following levels:

• Politics: The political commitment to knowledge protection forms the foundation, as it is a prerequisite for adequate resource allocation and the representation of the phenomenon in legislation.
• Authorities: The empirical study revealed that certain reservations exist among research institutions towards intelligence and security agencies. This is associated with an increase in the number of unreported suspicions. Therefore, authorities should actively work to reduce inhibitions.
• Research institutions: At both leadership and employee levels, there is often a prevailing understanding that protective measures hinder innovation in research. Striking a balance between enabling innovation and safeguarding knowledge from illegitimate access or misuse is essentially a risk management process. Only when university leaders and researchers recognize that risk management considers opportunities as well as risks can a productive approach to knowledge protection be ensured. Workshops and training sessions raise awareness of the dangers of scientific espionage.

The next step is the establishment of knowledge protection at the institutional level. To do this, a target analysis must be conducted regularly, identifying which research areas of an organization need protection. Only when precise knowledge is available about which scientific topics of the institution might be targeted for espionage can targeted measures be implemented. This includes identifying the “crown jewels”, which are the most sensitive or valuable research results. The result of the target analysis is reflected in cross-institutional protective measures, including monitoring and vetting processes. This means that scientific collaboration is assessed in terms of its potential risks, which can be derived from the research goal, the orientation of the partner university, and the background of the foreign researcher. In order to identify threats and espionage potential, it is also necessary to look at the interests of other nations. Since it is hardly reasonable to expect researchers or research organizations to inform themselves about the national interests of partner countries in addition to their scientific work, security authorities and intelligence services should provide support here. However, it must be clear where the limits of their areas of competence are in order to avoid giving the impression of censorship: While the security authorities and intelligence services can pass on their expertise regarding threats and espionage methods to the research institutions, the latter must be able to remain autonomous in deciding which fields of research are sensitive. Individual researchers cannot be required to identify and assess the risks of their own research, as this would place them in a conflict of interest. Internal legal and ethics department expertise should be involved in this evaluation.

The implementation of an information security management system is a technical measure for securing research results. This includes ensuring basic IT security, sandboxing, using multi-factor authentication, and introducing access and entry restrictions. To counter the prejudice that such security measures inhibit creativity, it may be helpful to introduce an innovation management process, for example, based on the Stage-Gate process by Cooper A process-oriented approach ensures finding synergies, quality assurance, and information security. Research projects are divided into individual, sequentially structured project phases with different security levels. While openness is significant in the initial phase to stimulate exchange between researchers and foster innovation, the need-to-know principle restricts access to information towards the end to prevent endangering the exploitation of results.

The majority of individuals interviewed in the empirical study shared the assessment that scientific espionage will increase in the future. Therefore, a clear strategy for dealing with this risk is needed. In the course of upcoming research projects, particular attention should be paid to emphasizing practical relevance. How research institutions can develop appropriate protective measures, tailored to their size, orientation, and available resources, should be investigated. The result of these efforts should be a modular knowledge protection concept that is standardized but can be adapted to the needs of stakeholders and aims at synchronizing the efforts of individual stakeholders.

The origins of the word manifesto can be traced back to 17th Century Italy, meaning a public statement or view, written for the purpose of advancing a set of ideas, opinions or ideology.

Historically these declarative documents have criticised the established political or social state of affairs and sought to inspire novel or fundamental societal change on behalf of the oppressed or unconventional non-conformist element. Manifestos the likes of Marx and Engel’s 1848 ‘Communist Manifesto’ and Lenin’s 1901 ‘What is to be Done?’ promoted communism as a means of abolishing capitalism and the class system. Hitler’s 1924 autobiographical manifesto ‘Mein Kampf’ (My Struggle) promoted his anti-Semitic racist ideology and grievances, becoming the forbearer of the Nazi regime. The manifesto evolved from being a blueprint for social and political revolution to being an exploitive communicative propaganda strategy, aiming to gain personal notoriety and to justify and promote fringe ideologies. Ted Kaczynski, who infamously earned the moniker ‘Unabomber’ due to his mail bombs that killed 3 and injured 23 others between 1978 and 1996, coerced the NY Times into publishing his 56-page manifesto with the threat of another attack should his demands not be met. The misogynistic and racially charged manifesto resonates with the perceived grievances of the contemporary extreme right milieu and served to express his anti-technological and environmental ideology, while also attempting to energise or radicalise like-minded individuals. Despite Kaczynski’s letter bomb campaign lasting 18 years, the attacks alone had failed to effectively communicate and propagate his ideology. The public dissemination of his manifesto demonstrated the power of this communicative tool. As a result, Kaczynski’s use of the media to disseminate his manifesto influenced the evolution and reliance on social media and mainstream news organisations in the contemporary era of western mass violence and extremism.
This paper will demonstrate how the distribution of extremist messaging and manifestos has come to act as a definitive component of contemporary terrorism, especially in the extreme right-wing milieu. Louis Beam’s concept of the leaderless resistance calls for individuals to “take their cues from others who precede them”, inspiring not only lone actor attacks, but providing a signature from which their ideological connections can be assessed on the basis of the existence of a manifesto. The real emergence of the contemporary manifesto can be attributed to Breivik’s 1500-page manifesto ‘2083 – A European Declaration of Independence’. This proved to be instrumental as a prototype for extremist narratives published online by far-right lone actor offenders. A digital copy of the manifesto, containing a link to a 12-minute YouTube slideshow of the primary themes contained in the manifesto, was distributed by email to 1003 recipients in the UK and Europe 90 minutes prior to the Oslo attack. The 2019 Christchurch shooter sought to emulate the anti-immigration, anti-Islamic themes within his ‘Great Replacement’ manifesto, clearly meeting the criteria indicated by Berger for a manifesto as requiring “a clear statement of ideology”.

Those following in the wake of the deadly acts of terrorism committed in Norway and Christchurch sought not only to honour the acts of these terrorists, but to use violence and manifestos to achieve the same notoriety. Media coverage of the November 22, 2022 mass shooting at a Virginia, USA, Walmart reported the shooter responsible for killing 6 people before taking his own life had left a manifesto on his phone in addition to a kill list found in his home. The so-called manifesto contained personal grievances regarding his workplace and colleagues, without any ideological statements or connections to previous ideologically related incidents. A colleague of the shooter who reported him previously commenting “if he ever got fired, he would retaliate and people would remember him.” Other reports of the shooting more precisely refer to the communication found in his phone as a ‘note’ or ‘death note’. Unlike other mass shootings and terrorist acts, the shooter did not post his communication online, with the self-titled “Death Note” found during a forensic analysis of the phone located at the scene.
The manifesto moniker has become misused as a catch all term used to describe communications made by offenders in conjunction with actual or planned acts of mass violence and terrorism. Messages, memes or online posts are universally being referred to as manifestos, despite containing no ideological content or intent. The manifesto terminology has come to represent any message or communication associated with mass shootings or mass violence events. The signature messaging or manifestos that accompany these lethal attacks raise the profile of the incidents amongst other commonplace school shootings that are becoming a weekly occurrence across the USA. Contemporary manifestos (in the broadest sense of the term) serve as a signifier for the perpetrator’s ideological allegiance and motivation that are generalised under the right-wing banner, despite this becoming a catch all term applied to many non-jihadist violence. The manifesto in itself is a performative symbol, both in the embedded ideology and the strategic use of the online environment for widespread and live distribution. The use of livestream and video uploads to platforms like YouTube have made the manifesto and first-person communication become a pivotal manifestation in the enhanced digital tech and online space. The communicative piece aims to not only justify their radicalisation process and proclaimed motivations, but to highlight the perpetrators tactical implementation, target / location selection and weaponry.
The manifesto became the signature of attacks loosely connected under the fluid extreme right ideology that comprises of anti-Semitic and misogynistic attitudes, holocaust denial and strong ties to online gaming. Anti-feminist, misogynistic and incel (involuntary celibate) ideologies have also demonstrated a strong connection to glorifying acts of other incels that produced self-titled manifestos and other online material.
The online environment and the idiosyncratic communities that honour and seek to replicate acts of violence have played a vital role in the popularity of producing manifestos and related forms of communication. The ease with which this material can be accessed and shared is unique to the contemporary era, however, traditional published formats such as ‘Mein Kampf’ continue to be published and distributed globally.
‘Mein Kampf’ was republished in an annotated version in Germany in 2016 for the first time since World War II, selling 24,000 copies and reaching the best seller list in seven weeks. The annotated version provided thousands of notations and commentary debunking the propaganda and falsehoods contained in Hitler’s notorious manifesto. The book had previously been available internationally and various versions were available online, however, the copyright was owned by the Bavarian state, effectively banning its publication until the time the copyright expired. Despite German efforts to ban Nazi paraphernalia and texts spreading anti-Semitic and racist ideology, the continued ability to access such material in the contemporary digital era demonstrates the limitations available to authorities to prevent access to these materials and the acts of mass violence that are inspired by these publications. New Zealand’s swift enactment of terrorism laws in the wake of the Christchurch massacre included the banning of semi-automatic weapons and criminalising the possession of the shooter’s manifesto and livestream of the terrorist attack.
The online environment has played a significant role in the increase of attacks, the use of messaging to gain online and international notoriety and the escalation in the lethality of attacks. White Supremacist websites the likes of ‘Stormfront’ are responsible for inspiring racist, white nationalist hate crimes, with close to 100 murders connected to the website’s users between 2010 and 2015. The online environment acts as an echo for extremist ideas amongst likeminded individuals and provides an expansive pool from which these people can be radicalised and encouraged to commit acts of violence. Manifestos and white supremacist material produced by the likes of Louis Beam and William Luther Pierce’s Turner Diaries are venerated within these communities and act as instructional guides or “Handbook for White Victory”. This material is widely available online and has been responsible for inspiring terrorists the likes of Breivik, who in turn created his own white supremacist propaganda in the manifesto he uploaded online.
The reported 300,000, users comprised of an estimated 200,000 from the USA alone, are also heavily active on other forums including 4Chan, 8Chan, gaming site Twitch and social media sites Facebook and Twitter. An analysis of White Nationalist movements and themes of ‘white genocide’ and ‘white race’ have increased by 600% between 2012 and 2016 as indicated by Berger.

The use of Facebook and Twitch livestreaming to portray attacks in First Person Shooter style associated with video games is another connection to these attacks that seek to replicate and surpass the ‘kill score’ of their predecessors. The Poway, California Synagogue shooter attempted to emulate the March 2019 Christchurch massacre in April 2019, armed with tactical vest and camera which failed to stream the attack. Similarly, the German Halle Synagogue shooting in October 2019 was livestreamed on gaming site Twitch in an attack that killed 2 people.

The attack was described by Peter Neuman as being a deliberate attempt to attract an international audience, as both the livestream and his accompanying manifesto were in English despite this not being his first language. The 11-page manifesto contained anti-Semitic, Jewish world conspiracy and Holocaust denial ideology, with the attack coinciding with Yom Kippur, regarded as the holiest day of Jewish faith. The broad scope of ideologies encompassed under the extreme right banner has been embraced by perpetrators seeking notoriety in an otherwise anonymous online environment. The variety of individual grievances and bias against other minorities is amplified within the online echo chamber of
equally isolated or aggrieved personalities within the gaming and Chan communities.

Conclusion
The term ‘manifesto’ has become a catch all term used by perpetrators and the media reporting any communications that accompany acts of mass violence and terrorism. Historical autobiographical and political manifestos published by revolutionaries and dictators made way for the Unabomber’s 35,000-word manuscript, published by The Washington Post in 1995. These manifestos contained clear statements of ideology and views of the author published in traditional written statements, notwithstanding the Unabomber’s manuscript being published under threat of further bombings.
The online environment and technological advances proved critical in the resurgence of manifestos being published and shared online. Accessibility to online social media and gaming sites has enabled manifestos to become the pivotal element that facilitates the distribution piece of this performative act. The presence of these actual or communicative pieces represented as manifestos have increasingly become indicators of right-wing motivations since the contagion effect created by the 2011 Norway terrorist attacks. The reporting of these attacks by mainstream media provides the offenders with the publicity required to communicate personal grievances and ideology, and, in doing so, creates an identity which they have predominantly lacked outside of their online communities. This notoriety or infamy provides a persona forever linked to the loose group ideology, and through the manifesto,
permanently places their name amongst the ranks of those who have been elevated to the rank of sainthood by so many likeminded individuals within online and gaming communities. In order to deny these individuals, the notoriety they seek, not only is it important to condemn their violent actions through responsible media reporting and oversite of online platforms that publish and disseminate these manifestos, but as a society reject these narratives and proactively address these perceived grievances and injustices to prevent these narratives becoming the new normal.

The Fiji election of 14 December 2022 was the third held under the 2013 Constitution. It resulted in a narrow victory for the opposition parties, which together obtained 29 of the 55 seats. In the Prime Ministerial vote held on Christmas Eve, People’s Alliance Party leader Sitiveni Rabuka was selected as Prime Minister by 28 votes to 27. The election brought to an end 16 years of semi-authoritarian rule by the military-backed government that assumed office in the wake of the December 2006 coup. Bainimarama’s FijiFirst Party had won the 2014 elections with 59% of the popular vote and the 2018 elections, more narrowly, with 50.02% of the nationwide vote. In December 2022, that party secured 42.6% of the vote, which was enough to make it the largest party in parliament with 26 seats, but not enough to form a government. The December 2006 coup leader and 2007-22 Prime Minister Frank (‘Voreqe’) Bainimarama became Leader of the Opposition.

Fiji is a small Pacific Island country located to the east of Australia. It has a population of around 900,000, the vast majority of whom live on the main island of Vitu Levu. It was a British colony from 1874 to 1970. Under British colonial rule, over 60,000 indentured labourers were brought from the Indian subcontinent to work in the sugar cane fields. By the 1940s, the descendants of those migrants outnumbered the indigenous population. By the 1980s, the two populations were close to parity, owing to a recovery in indigenous fertility rates. By 2007, the Fiji Indian population was down to 36.7% and the indigenous share up to 55.8%, largely due to out-migration by Fiji Indians to Australia, New Zealand or North America. Ethnic affinities have been an important basis for electoral loyalties in the past. For most of the post-independence period, there was one large party that appealed to indigenous Fijians and another large party that appealed to Fiji Indians. This was not the case in December 2022: that election was fought between two multi-ethnic parties or coalitions.

After independence, Fiji experienced three coups: in 1987, 2000 and 2006. The first, in May 1987, was a military coup that came shortly after the election of a largely Fiji Indian backed coalition. On 19 May 2000, a second coup followed the May 1999 election of another mainly Fiji Indian-backed party led by Fiji’s first ever Prime Minister of Indian descent, Mahendra Chaudhry. This time, the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) was split. The then RFMF Commander, Frank Bainimarama, led a counter coup on 29 May 2000 and abrogated the 1997 Constitution, but he handed over the reins of power to a civilian government in July 2000. On 5 December 2006, Bainimarama overthrew another elected government, but this time that government was one that had been backed at an election held eight months earlier by 80% of indigenous Fijians. Unlike its predecessors, the 2006 coup was initially depicted as a ‘clean-up campaign’ against corruption and as a military takeover designed to bring an end to ethnic discord, but there followed extensive repression of the opposition, media censorship and the abrogation of the constitution in 2009.  It was on the basis of an egalitarian, meritocratic and development-oriented agenda that Bainimarama’s FijiFirst Party was able to win the 2014 and 2018 elections. Whereas the ethnic divide was the key cleavage around which parties were configured prior to the 2006 coup, at the elections of 2014, 2018 and 2022 the key cleavage was between the party that assumed office as a result of the 2006 coup (FijiFirst) and those parties opposed to that coup.

The December 2022 election, like those of 2014 and 2018, was conducted using an open list proportional representation system. The entire country was treated as a single constituency with 55 seats and a 5% threshold. The ballot paper featured only numbers, with each number representing a candidate. After the polls, ballots are counted to establish the number of seats for each party using the d’Hondt system. Once the party tallies are known, the seats secured by each party are allotted to its candidates with the highest votes. One consequence is that some candidates may be elected with lower vote tallies than others. This arose in all three of the elections since the passage of the 2013 Constitution. It was explained by a difference in campaign tactics between FijiFirst and the opposition parties and, initially in 2014, by the strong personal popularity of military commander-turned civilian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama. During those campaigns, FijiFirst emphasised Bainimarama’s personal ballot paper number whereas the opposition parties had more candidates with a strong vote at the local level. Whereas FijiFirst used a ‘rock star’ high profile party leader focussed campaign strategy, the opposition parties had a more even distribution of their votes across their candidates. Hence, many FijiFirst candidates were elected on the basis of Bainimarama’s personal vote.

After 2014, numerous electoral amendments were passed that disadvantaged the opposition, including laws to diminish the autonomy of the electoral commission, to expand the authority of the Supervisor of Elections and to require parties to cost their campaign pledges. Another amendment required women to register in the name on their birth certificates, disenfranchising many women who had hitherto been registered using their married names. After the FijiFirst election defeat in December 2022, the Supervisor of Elections, Mohammed Saneem, was suspended ahead of a disciplinary tribunal but he then resigned to avoid the proceedings.

During the 2022 election campaign, FijiFirst echoed its tactics of 2014 and 2018 by appealing for personal votes for its leaders: Bainimarama and his Attorney-General and Minister for the Economy, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. The latter had served as de facto Prime Minister during the governments of 2014-18 and 2018-22, with Bainimarama playing a more ceremonial role, touring the country to open roads, wharves, bridges and buildings and travelling regularly overseas to attend international events, such as climate change summits. Most of FijiFirst’s ministers re-contested and were re-elected, but most of the other FijiFirst candidates were new. The FijiFirst manifesto defended the incumbent government’s achievements in protecting the country during the Covid-19 pandemic. That pandemic hit the country’s tourism industry particularly badly, with visitor arrivals falling to near to zero over 2020-21. The national airline, Fiji Airways, was driven close to bankruptcy but was bailed out by the government and then rescued by the country’s main pension fund acquiring a major stake in July 2022. By November 2022, visitor arrivals had recovered to close to pre-pandemic levels. In December, FijiFirst again acquired most of its support from Fiji Indian voters and an overwhelming majority among citizens residing in the western part of Viti Levu, Fiji’s largest island. At one campaign rally, Bainimarama told his audience that ‘my party should be in power forever because it will provide unity forever’.

Ahead of the 2022 polls, the opposition was thoroughly reconfigured. A new party, the People’s Alliance Party, was established and able to largely displace what was formerly the largest opposition party, SODELPA (the Social Democratic and Liberal Party). SODELPA was a reincarnation of the party that held office prior to the 2006 coup, when it was led by Laisenia Qarase. After serving a prison sentence for what Amnesty International has described as a politically-motivated corruption conviction, Qarase was prohibited from contesting in 2014. At the 2018 polls, SODELPA was instead led by Sitiveni Rabuka, the 1987 coup leader and 1992-99 Prime Minister. After the 2018 election defeat, a fractious leadership contest within SODELPA led to Rabuka being replaced as party leader by Viliame Gavoka, a former Chief Executive at the Fiji Visitors Bureau. Rabuka responded by resigning both as an MP and SODELPA member and by commencing preparations ahead of the launch of his People’s Alliance Party. 

Half of SODELPA’s MPs defected to the People’s Alliance before the 2022 election, including traditional chief of Cakaudrove province, Tui Cakau Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu and trade union rights and anti-poverty activist Lynda Tabuya. The People’s Alliance was also able to attract numerous high profile new candidates, including Manoa Kamikamica (now one of three deputy prime ministers). SODELPA was left with only 5% of the national vote, as compared to the People’s Alliance Party’s 35.8%. Whereas SODELPA remained an almost entirely indigenous-backed party, the People’s Alliance was able to attract some minority support from within the Fiji Indian community, as seen in the election of Fiji Indian businessman Charan Jeath Singh drawing on a sizable personal vote on the country’s second largest island, Vanua Levu. The People’s Alliance secured a majority of the votes from Vanua Levu and most of the outer islands and, critically, was neck and neck with FijiFirst in the densely populated Central Division, which covers the southeastern part of Viti Levu. When single-member electorates were used (1972-2006), district design discriminated in favour of the sparsely populated rural areas. By now treating the entire country as a single district, Fiji has ended the former bias against the more densely populated urban areas.

Rabuka established a coalition with the National Federation Party (NFP), echoing the close alliance he had forged with that party under the leadership of Jai Ram Reddy in the late 1990s. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the NFP had been a predominantly Fiji Indian-backed party. From the 2014 election onwards, it cultivated a more multi-ethnic appeal. Under the leadership of former economics professor Biman Prasad, and with former military officer and permanent secretary Pio Tikoduadua serving as party president, the party was able to lift its share of the vote from 7.4 in 2018 to 8.9% in 2022, and its number of seats from three to five. The party released no manifesto ahead of the 2018 polls, owing to fears of potentially violating the government’s strict electoral amendments relating to costing manifesto commitments. NFP’s leaders, like those of the People’s Alliance, were regularly brought in for police ‘questioning’ during the campaign. Three of SODELPA’s sitting MPs were unable to contest because they were serving prison sentences in December 2018, in each case for claiming allowances by stating that their main place of residence was their home village while they were residing in the capital, Suva.

Turnout across the whole of Fiji was 67.8% of registered voters, down from the 70.9% in 2018. Use of designated polling stations lowered turnout, as did delaying the election until mid-December, close to Christmas and in the midst of Fiji’s rainy season.     

Figure 1: Results of the 14 December 2022 Election

The results of the December 2022 election left Fiji in a delicately balanced situation. FijiFirst had 26 seats in the 55-member parliament. Together, the People’s Alliance (21) and the National Federation Party (5) also had 26 seats. During the initial provisional ballot count, it looked as if all of the other parties would fall below the 5% threshold (see Figure 1). If so, FijiFirst would have won the election. Yet at the final count, SODELPA narrowly crossed the threshold with 5.1% of the vote, giving it the decisive three seats in parliament. Similar to the People’s Alliance, SODELPA prioritised indigenous rights issues. It was deeply opposed to FijiFirst policies, such as the 2012 abolition of the country’s Great Council of Chiefs, formerly the peak body in the country’s indigenous order. On the other hand, there was much bad blood between SODELPA and the People’s Alliance owing to the rancorous 2020 leadership contest, the defection of so many SODELPA MPs, and the People’s Alliance campaign tactic of insisting that a vote for the smaller parties was a ‘wasted vote’. In addition, SODELPA leader Viliame Gavoka is father-in-law to Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, the FijiFirst General Secretary and right-hand man to Bainimarama, which encouraged many to suspect that family ties might encourage support for a coalition with FijiFirst. Yet at the initial meeting of the SODELPA Management Board to decide whether the party would go into coalition with FijiFirst or with the other opposition parties, the party came down 16:14 in favour of joining the opposition coalition. Joyous celebrations by opposition supporters ensued.

The next day, however, party General Secretary Lenaitasi Duru claimed that the Management Board decision had not been reached in accordance with SODELPA’s constitution. The Supervisor of Elections and the Attorney General agreed. At this precarious juncture, the Police Commissioner, Sitiveni Qiliho, himself a former military officer and strong Bainimarama loyalist, claimed that ‘stoning incidents’ were occurring that were targeting ‘minority groups’ (i.e., Fiji Indians) and called out the army. Many feared that this was being used as a pretext for yet another coup. The precarious security situation was used to place the SODELPA Management Board under duress as they re-convened to again decide on their coalition partner. For the second such meeting, five of those who had voted at the first Management Board meeting were ruled ineligible. Again, FijiFirst and the opposition party leaders initially attended the meeting offering ministerial portfolios, board memberships and other inducements to SODELPA. On 23 December, SODELPA again decided in favour of a coalition with the opposition parties, this time by 13 votes to 12. The Military Commander, Jone Kalouniwai, who had promised in early December to honour the election result, stood by his word. Only a small military deployment was ordered to support the heavily policed re-run of the SODELPA gathering.

After Rabuka’s election as Prime Minister on Christmas Eve by 28 to 27 votes, Bainimarama told the media: ‘this is democracy, this is my legacy: the 2013 Constitution’. Yet the security situation remained fraught. In two FijiFirst press conferences in early January, Bainimarama delivered blistering attacks on the new Government, accusing it of breaching the 2013 Constitution and calling on constitutional office-holders, including the Police Commissioner and Commissioner of Prisons, to refuse appeals for their resignation. Military Commander Jone Kalouniwai issued a statement warning the government against breaching the separation of powers, but his officers remained in the barracks. He also repeatedly appeared alongside government ministers, including both Rabuka and Home Affairs Minister Pio Tikoduadua, so as to reassure the nation that the military was behind the new Government. Appeals were also made by Bainimarama and Sayed-Khaiyum to the President, Ratu Wiliame Katonivere, who had until then been closely aligned with FijiFirst, to step in to pronounce the new Government in breach of the constitution. He refused. On 16 February, Bainimarama delivered a speech in parliament attacking the President and appealing to the rank and file in the military to protect the 2013 Constitution. He was suspended for three years for breaching Standing Orders. If the new Government survives, the December 2022 election will be Fiji’s first ever enduring transition of power since independence. Changes in government in 1987, 2000 and 2006 were each followed by coups, the first within a month, the second a year later and the third after eight months. Fiji is therefore not out of the woods yet. The fact that powerful constitutional office-holders, particularly the President and the Military Commander, have sided with the Rabuka-led government augers well, but some of those in the military continue to defend the 2006 coup as if it were a ‘noble’ act by the RFMF. The 2013 Constitution remains a major issue. It was imposed on the people of Fiji. No elected representatives were responsible for its formulation. It was not passed by way of a referendum. Yet it cannot be amended without the support of 75% of MPs followed by the endorsement of 75% of all registered voters in a referendum – an extraordinarily high threshold. Given continuing military support for the 2013 Constitution, the new Government is well advised to tread cautiously. There is no need for hurry. Nothing in the 2013 Constitution prohibits the initiation of a review process, at the appropriate time. Deliberation is in any case necessary on a suitable replacement, which will require extensive consultation. Until then, the Fiji government is advised to cement its own position, to deal firmly with spoilers of the transition but not to pursue vendettas against all of those who accommodated with the FijiFirst governments. The early signs are promising, but the passage of time will bring fresh challenges.

Political and Legal System
The Constitution of the country, enacted at independence on 1 January 1962, was the subject of national consultations conducted in 1956 and 1960, drawing together the traditional nobility, cultural leaders and orators, together with the local captains of commerce who were often the descendants of foreign traders and adventurers.
Of considerable prominence (during the recorded discussions of these Constitutional conventions) was the overriding concern that the country’s unique customs and traditions (through its system of chiefly order and cultural observances) be a defining touchstone in the Constitution, together with the need to recognise Christianity in Samoan society.
To direct its future, Samoa adopted the Westminster system of representative democracy, with three year electoral terms, choosing as its representatives chiefs and orators from the traditional geographic districts of the island state. There are also seats reserved for prominent, mixed heritage leaders who contributed to the commercial life of the country.

One Party Dominance
Since 1981, one party has dominated the political landscape in Samoa. Formed after a period of intense instability from 1980 to 1981, the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) has been in Government for 40 years under two Prime Ministers: Tofilau Eti Alesana and Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi. The latter was the first Deputy Prime Minister, and then held the position of Prime Minister from 1998 to 2021, making him one of the longest serving prime ministers in the Commonwealth and the world.
HRPP’s political dominance came to an abrupt end at the general elections held in April 2021, after the 52 seat Parliament comprising 46 HRPP members and 6 others, completed their 5-year term in December 2020.
Much to the surprise of the incumbent HRPP administration, a new party formed less than a year before the general elections called Fa’atuatua I Le Atua Samoa ua Tasi [translated as Samoa United as One in Faith to God]. More commonly known as the FAST Party, the Party received 25 votes which – together with the vote of an independent Member of Parliament – was able to garner a one seat majority to claim the Election.
What followed from April 2021 until the final Court of Appeal decision confirming the legitimate government was a period of extraordinary legal and political events. They were fuelled by the refusal of the former Prime Minister to relinquish his grip on political power and included a number of unique events:
• a ‘dead of night’ administrative appointment of an additional female HRPP MP by the Electoral Commissioner, when it was clear that the independent member was due to announce his support of the new FAST Party, thus effectively creating a constitutional ‘deadlock’ of equal votes in Parliament 26-26, an appointment which was later declared unlawful by the Supreme Court;
• another late night declaration by the country’s Head of State (acting on the advice of the Caretaker administration) ‘voiding’ the results of the general election and calling for a new election in two weeks, also later declared unlawful by the Supreme Court;
• the prolonged refusal by the Head of State (acting on advice) to convene Parliament in order to allow the elected members to determine the party with the majority of members’ votes;
• a proclamation issued by the Head of State (acting on advice) to convene Parliament on 24 May 2021, which was then ‘voided’ by a further proclamation made a few days later;
• the first Parliamentary session (including the swearing in of members of the FAST Party as members of parliament and the appointment of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly as well as the first female Prime Minister and 12 members of Cabinet) took place under a tent erected outside Parliament House, because the latter was locked by the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly, at the direction of the former Speaker;
The political deadlock was finally broken by the Court of Appeal presided over by the Chief Justice, which declared the ‘tent’ swearing in lawful. So four months after the general election and intense times, the FAST Party finally took up its role as the government of the day, led by Samoa’s first female Prime Minister, the Honorable Fiame Naomi Mata’afa, the daughter of Samoa’s first ever Prime Minister, the late Honorable Fiame Mata’afa Faumuina Mulinu’u II, and his wife, the Honorable Laulu Fetauimalemau Mata’afa, also a former member of parliament.

Threads from the Present
Multilateral donors would often remark that Samoa’s extended period of political stability under HRPP was the foundation for its many achievements and milestones. Internationally, Samoa also played a leading role representing the Pacific in international, regional and Commonwealth events for the last two decades. And whilst it is true that the development of public infrastructure, including universal access to electricity, water and public transport, and the embrace of advances in public and financial sector reform, technology and innovation may be attributed to HRPP, their response to a free and fair election detracted from that history of achievement.
Some would observe that longevity in political leadership, and the concentration of public power and resources in the hands of one Leader (the former Prime Minister), would almost inevitably end ‘in tears’, and such was the case in Samoa.
Over the past two decades, the near total control within Parliament, Cabinet and the public sector by the former Prime Minister was mirrored by the weakening of the independence of the public sector and public servants. Appointments to public offices, the boards of public companies and constitutional roles were no longer left to independent bodies, but were pulled back to the hands of a Cabinet distinguished by the sober, unquestioning and silent obedience by all its members to the Leader. Samoa was under the control of one of the Pacific’s ‘strongmen’.
Nepotism, favouritism, and an increasing ‘opaqueness’ in decision making in the use of public funds and resources was matched by a public service offered personal benefits for loyalty. These benefits were perceived as coming from the Leader’s own benevolence. The resulting sense of ‘personal entitlement’ in the public service, and close emotional links to the former Leader, have created obstacles to the ability of the new government to govern, as most senior public ‘servants’ stood at the heart of opposition to the new administration.
Perhaps democracy’s greatest manifestation in Samoa in 2021 was the ability for voters to change the path the country had been treading for 40 years, by the conduct of free and fair elections and the access to, and the use of, an independent judiciary.
In short, the people of Samoa chose FAST over HRPP in the 2021 general elections by the slimmest of margins – just one vote. However, reflecting the change in national mood and the outcome of subsequent electoral petitions, FAST now have 31 seats and HRPP 20 seats in Parliament.
The long standing incumbent administration (the caretaker government in the interregnum) employed a range of strategies to prevent the FAST Party from taking office. Public officers and office holders were placed under enormous pressure by the incumbent government to obey their directions and by the new party and the public to act independently and simply do their jobs ‘without fear or favour’ in the struggle to govern. The former Prime Minister enticed and directed public officials to exercise their powers to prevent and disrupt the accession to power of the duly elected administration.

The Independent Judiciary
The solitary institution which prevented Samoa’s slide to autocracy was the country’s Judicial branch of Government which remained independent and immune from improper influence. The Chief Justice, the Honorable Satiu Simativa Perese, the Supreme Court and its esteemed Judges, were prevailed upon (in the period after the general elections) to determine a range of constitutional matters never previously decided, and to define the parameters of government authority and legitimacy, in a country riven by an increasingly sharp political rhetoric from the previous administration. The Judiciary discharged their important duties with diligence, grace and honour.
To say the country was ‘saved by the law’ would neither be too dramatic nor too evocative, the public were transfixed by the multiple court hearings, awaited their outcomes with anxiety and expectation, they knew the rulings from the Court would direct the country’s future prospects. Never has ‘the Constitution’ figured so prominently in daily life, nor have legal arguments been discussed so heatedly around the dinner tables and kava bowls of this small land.
If there is a prevailing thread in what Samoa has experienced last year, then it is the unquestionable need, indeed absolute imperative, for society to support and strengthen the institutions and high principles which define the lives of free men and women where:
•the value of a vote is powerful and transformative;
• the Rule of Law protects the governed and limits the governors;
• an independent and well-resourced Judiciary serves and protects the people;
• a free press supports liberty and freedom;
• democratic values are the foundation stone for life, liberty and freedom;
• courage and integrity lie at the heart of ethical and successful leadership;
• Faith in God and seeking His Grace and Mercy upon all His people, offers hope and purpose in
all we do.
Samoa has emerged from its recent malady of instability and restlessness, with its core values battered, yet intact, due to the emerging and powerful leadership of those who have dreams and plans to prosper and not harm the country and its people.
If democracy as an ideal, a process and a destination prevails, then our freedom, our choices and the opportunity to enhance our lives and the lives of others will be assured.

The study of terrorism was observed by Martha Crenshaw as taking centre stage in the wake of 9/11, despite previously being regarded as “too policy-orientated to be of serious academic significance.”³ Scholarly research addressing terrorism increased sevenfold in the post 9/11 era, leading to fundamental and sustained changes and improvements in understanding the manifestation and prevention of terrorism.⁴ Despite these two enterprises sharing a common purpose, academic researchers and CT practitioners continue to work, for the most part, independently from the agencies their work supports, and for appropriately different ends. The practitioner’s responsibility is to identify, prevent and prosecute terrorism offences in line with existing policies and practices. The academic’s research purpose is to understand, investigate and analyse political violence, terrorism and CT.⁵ The challenge within the CT environment is ensuring academic research is generating relevant and timely knowledge that can complement current practitioner practices. The disconnect between academic output and practitioner efforts is hindered by a number of factors, including the complex and evolving nature of terrorist activity, security classification of data, and the various moving parts associated with the array of agencies tasked with CT responsibilities.
The epistemic nature of academic research lends itself to uncovering knowledge and an understanding of the how and why. In this regard, terrorism research seeks to examine what terrorism is at its core, as well as who the terrorists are, and why they utilise terrorism as a strategy. This search for understanding of the world and how it impacts terrorist activity may provide insight into the who and why, without providing any explicit practical application relevant to how CT practitioners can apply this knowledge. It is at this point that the different ends of the academic and practitioner must be recognised, despite their shared common purpose.
Research as a method of collecting and interpreting knowledge is a separate and distinctly different enterprise to the teaching aspect of disseminating knowledge. Teaching is concerned with the activities focused on explaining, describing, demonstrating and exemplifying information or knowledge.⁶ It is this act of teaching the application of academic knowledge to the actions of the practitioner that is essential to bridging the divide that exists in the CT environment. This transfer of knowledge must not be considered a one-way transaction, i.e. academic research taught to practitioners. This process should be regarded as a continual cycle of knowledge transfer between the stakeholders in the CT landscape. Practitioner knowledge and experience can be equally as valuable as carefully conducted research, especially in an environment that seeks to integrate and optimise all perspectives. Using the 3C’s framework: context, capability and connectivity, we will examine the value of increased connectivity and cohesion across the broader CT community.
The definitions surrounding terrorism and CT remain a highly disputed and analysed aspect of both terrorism studies and international and national security policies. This is just one example of how ‘context’ can be critical, and, through research and teaching, can assist the CT practitioner in understanding the ecosystem in which they operate. Context explains the circumstances, background or conditions that exist or have impacted an event or situation.
The perspective of the context must be considered and examined to reduce the inherent biases that may have formed as an unconscious aspect of human nature and learning, which can effect a contentious and emotive issue such as CT. A lack of understanding of cultural or historical circumstances can create a unidimensional lens through which threats and responses are translated and interpreted. The Western post 9/11 lens demonstrates this myopic view of terrorism and terrorist activity as an exclusively Middle Eastern orientated problem. Challenging assumptions, explaining empirical distinctions, and encouraging critical discourse around the who, what and why of terrorism can be difficult, especially given the impact that imagery of the twin towers continues to hold for western audiences. University-based research and teaching can provide a crucial counterbalance to misguided or ill-informed analyses and can assist practitioners in developing a capability to counter these themselves.
The development of an understanding of context regarding terrorism issues can be demonstrated through historical disputes or grievances that have continued into the contemporary era such as the Israel/Palestine conflict. The contextualisation of terrorism and CT historically is an essential element to understanding not only the motivations, objectives and strategies used by terrorist organisations, but also the strengths, limitations, and consequences of counter terrorism practices, policies and legislation.⁷ The understanding of historical context to inform contemporary responses is a key benefit of combining research and education to inform CT policies and practices. Equally, the contextualisation of the strategies, techniques and capabilities of the myriad of government and non-government practitioners is vital in respect to academic research, and, thus, for education having a comprehensive and informed perspective from which to transfer this knowledge.
The importance of an informed perspective is vital given the diversity of political, cultural, religious, and ideological complexities associated with terrorism and, thus, CT. The changing and evolutionary nature of terrorism requires not only contextual knowledge and understanding, and contextually informed analysis, but also the capability to identify, collect and apply that knowledge in the real world.⁸ Understanding of operational or organisational capability is an essential element in understanding the scope or limitations available to implementing CT measures. The divide between research and practitioners is not merely the expectation of different ends, but of constraints that empirical research is unable to overcome. Academic researchers that provide not only an understanding of the world, but also the means to change it are constrained by their ability to expedite the processes of having research published or actioned by the relevant practitioners. Similarly, a practitioner with academic and practitioner expertise in counter-terrorism and operational strategy may meet the conditions of ‘capability’ as an individual, but have no ability to effect systemic organisational or legislative change.
Capability to effectively counter terrorism at all levels benefits from scholarly research and practitioners’ ability to contextualise a threat, but must further overcome the constraints imposed by a functional democratic society. The use of vehicles and IED’s as weapons is a proven terrorist strategy that has been adapted in response to CT measures introduced into society. As research identifies trends and practitioners implement measures, terrorist capabilities adapt accordingly. This fluidity of modus operandi requires the same mindset to be employed in countering these measures. The use of environmental and structural barriers in crowded places or high-risk locations or infrastructure such as sport stadiums has proven to be a deterrent to various terrorism efforts.

The use of vehicles as a weapon has proven to be an effective terrorist strategy, either to run down mass gatherings of pedestrians as seen in the Nice terror attack in 2016, or to house improvised explosive devices (IED’s) as demonstrated by Anders Breivik’s 2011 attack against government buildings in Oslo.⁹ Evidence based CT strategies including bollards, high visibility policing and CCTV are all successful measures, however, these mass securitisation features run the risk of creating a state of permanent anxiety, loss of privacy and the feeling of living in a police state.¹⁰ There is a delicate and difficult balance that modern democratic societies face in creating a safe, yet tolerant society in the age of terrorism.¹¹ Any stagnancy created by societal and national security complacency can cause a pendulum effect, whereby the farther we are away from the immediate fear from an act of terrorism, the less capacity and focus is dedicated towards preventing that threat.¹² The knee jerk reaction, or movement of the pendulum from one extreme to another was exemplified by the response after 9/11, whereby national security was prioritised as the first order of business, dedicating mass resources towards containing that threat. The United States’ military and national security response dedicated billions of dollars toward equipping practitioners with operational and intelligence capabilities, creating dedicated agencies for the purpose of preventing terrorist attacks. As the perceived immediate threat of terrorism has been foreshadowed by other societal issues, and the prioritisation of great power competition, the pendulum is swinging further away, education programs, research funding and operational / practitioner capabilities are re-tasked or reduced.
The pendulum metaphor can be used to represent the shifting nature of terrorist threats. The research, education and CT capabilities developed since 9/11 have had a focus on the Jihadist threat. The rising threat to Western democratic societies has pivoted in response to the increasing prevalence of extreme right wing (XRW) attacks. The Capitol Hill insurrection, the influx of anti-government activity worldwide in the wake of Covid-19 measures, and the increased diversity of idiosyncratic actors emerging because of these conditions requires a shift in focus by the national security apparatus. This shift must also adapt, re-educate, and re-equip our understanding of the context and capability. Universities, through their research and teaching programs, are adapting to this changing threat environment and can provide substantial assistance to CT organisations and agencies in understanding these changes.
The transnational connectivity that is being exploited by various extremist movements is the same connectivity that is required by CT focused research, education and CT practitioners. The connectivity element of the 3C’s framework applies to not only individuals or organisational stakeholders, but to the international community in the battle against terrorism. For example, Israeli intelligence was disseminated to Australian national security agencies and instrumental in the investigation of a failed terror attack of an Etihad flight departing from Sydney in 2017.¹³ International networks preventing the flow of funds offshore to finance terrorist organisations, or the international identification and proscription of emerging terrorist organisations are all aspects of CT connectivity. Building and reinforcing networks of practitioners, researchers, and educators is central to the ongoing capacity of counter-terrorism policies and practices remaining at the leading edge of the threat environment.

By recognising the shared purposes of research, education and CT practitioners we ensure that as terrorism evolves, we have the capability to understand the complexities of the threat, and, as such, can continue to develop informed policies and procedures to counter those threats. The global nature of Jihadi terrorism has created significant increases in national capability and capacity; however, we must ensure that we have the expertise garnered from research to identify emerging threats. Academic research holds little value if the knowledge is unable to be transferred into the concepts and ideas of students and practitioners. It is this connectivity between each element that is vital to not only preventing acts of terrorism, but to preventing societal hate and bias from becoming normalised, and, thus, developing into an existential threat to democratic societies. Universities have a vital role to play in assisting in the understanding of the context in which terrorism takes place; developing and strengthening the capability to analyse and understand terrorist threats, and in building and reinforcing the networks that cooperate in ongoing efforts to counter terrorism and defend the shared values of liberal democratic states.

Endnotes:

1. Resolution 1368 (unscr.com) http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1368
2. Byman, Daniel (2019): “Counterterrorism Strategies,” in: Erica Chenoweth, Richard English, Andreas Gofas and Stathis N. Kalyvas (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 623.
3. Crenshaw, Martha (2004): “Terrorism Strategies and Grand Strategies” in Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James Mahoney Ludes, eds. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2004.
4. Brian J. Phillips (2021): How Did 9/11 Affect Terrorism Research? Examining Articles and Authors, 1970–2019, Terrorism and Political Violence, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2021.1935889
5. Levi West & Kristy Campion. “Teaching terrorism and practitioners: context, capabilities, and connectivity in counter-terrorism knowledge and networks”, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, April 2021. Vol 16, No 1, 75-91. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2021.1889018
6. Isola Rajagopalan. “Concept of Teaching.” Shanlax International Journal of Education, vol. 7, no. 2, 2019, 5-8. https://doi.org/10.34293/ education.v7i2.329
7. lbid
8. Levi West & Kristy Campion. “Teaching terrorism and practitioners: context, capabilities, and connectivity in counter-terrorism knowledge and networks”, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, April 2021. Vol 16, No 1, 75-91. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2021.1889018
9. Annelis Pauwels, “Prevention of Gun, Knife, Bomb and Arson-based Killings by Single Terrorists” in The Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness, July 2021, Chapter 22 pages 678 – 703 ICCT, https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/03/Handbook-Ch-22-Pauwels-Prevention-of-Gun-Knife-Bomb-and-Arson-based-Killings-1.pdf
10. Amy Batley, “Counterterrorism Citizens” and the Neurotic City”, Conflict and Society: Advances in Research, 2021, Volume 7, Issue 1, 78-95
11. Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh. “The Pendulum Effect: Explaining Shifts in the Democratic Response to Terrorism”. Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy, 2005, Volume 5, No 1 pg 223- 233. https://doi-org.ezproxy.csu.edu.au/10.1111/j.1530-2415.2005.00068.x
12. Ibid
13. Andrew Zammit, “Operation Silves: Inside the 2017 Islamic State Sydney Plane Plot.” CTC Sentinel. April 2020, Vol.13 Issue 4. Operation Silves: Inside the 2017 Islamic State Sydney Plane Plot – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (usma.edu), https://ctc.usma.edu/operation-silves-inside-the-2017-islamic-state-sydney-plane-plot/