1. Introduction

The phenomenon of terrorism is puzzling. This is the case for several reasons, one of them being the clandestine environment in which terrorist groups operate. Access to first-hand information is limited by the secrecy surrounding the phenomenon and related to its underground existence by security concerns. Since terrorism is a black box for scientists and the rest of society alike, several myths and conspiracy theories have developed for example for the purpose of gaining control of the unpredictable dynamics that characterize individual and organizational radicalization and de-radicalization. We either underestimate, overestimate or misinterpret terrorism because of its unpredictability, lack of first-hand insights as well as of fear which terrorist groups themselves try to provoke. Finally, terrorism is full of contradictions. Researching the phenomenon means studying leaders of terrorist organizations who admit to making mistakes, right-wing radicals without empathy who nevertheless seek recognition, terrorist organizations which imitate their enemies and radicalization of the educated and well-off. It is often difficult to comprehend why terrorists do what they do, and what dynamics shape their actions.

When I studied Conflict Analysis in Belgium shortly after September 11^th, I exchanged views? with my American co-students. They were convinced that the attacks on the twin towers made our generation a unique generation coined by terrorism. The perception that today everything is worse than in the past and that the presence is especially burdening is a common misinterpretation. Several statistics show that the world had recently become more peaceful. Europe recently belonged to the most peaceful regions in the world. A look into the past testifies that the present might not be that particular in comparison. Our parents were in the middle of the Cold War, our grandparents lived during one or two World Wars. What is more, while my co-students thought that our generation stands out because of September 11^th, we are currently seeing a generation growing up coined by the Covid-19 pandemic. Our perceptions frequently are blurred and biased and so are our perceptions about terrorism. However, although it is hard to access reliable information and data about terrorists because they operate in secrecy, it is nevertheless possible to identify patterns. In this paper I will, firstly, outline some of the misinterpretations of the terrorism phenomenon and I will, secondly, give insights into the inner life of terrorist organizations. While leading the research group ‘How ‘Terrorists’ learn’ at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology I have conducted extensive field research together with my team, which allowed us to derive findings that contribute to breaking up the black box of the nebulous terrorism phenomenon.

2.1. Underestimation of Terrorism: Conspiracy Theories around 9/11

One form of misinterpreting terrorism is its underestimation. Take for example the attacks on the Twin Towers. September 11^th is sometimes called the mother of conspiracy theories and indeed several myths rank around that day.¹ Several people believe in alternative explanations for the twin-tower attacks and in the United States a whole movement – the ‘Truther Movement’ – exists. Truthers do not believe that Al Qaeda was responsible. There is no unity in the truther movement regarding who in the end was the perpetrator, but many believe that members of the US government let the attacks happen or were even involved. The argument underlying this claim is that the US government needed a reason to invade Afghanistan and Iraq to get access to oil. Other truthers believe that the Mossad or Jewish Bankers are responsible; antisemitism almost always is part of conspiracy theories. What is astonishing is that these myths flourish although Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda confessed that they perpetrated the attacks. It seems many underestimate terrorist groups and rather look for those responsible of attacks among the powerful.

2.2. Overestimation of terrorism: The New Terrorism

Another form of misinterpreting terrorism is its overestimation, leading for example to the magnification of countermeasures. The war on terror has been a direct consequence of 9/11. It was assumed that a threat had emerged no one had ever witnessed before. In order to differentiate between the past and this new threat the term ‘New Terrorism’ proved useful.² Although this concept had already been proposed in the 1990ies, September 11^th seemed to confirm the assumptions made earlier. These assumptions include that the new terrorism is globally connected. Thus, rather than operating as organizations with clear hierarchies, new terrorisms can be understood as networks. It was further assumed that the new terrorism had access to Weapons of Mass Destruction. Fears of a dirty bomb or of chemical weapons characterized the years following 9/11. It was moreover generally assumed that the new terrorism was more deadly, more apocalyptic and therewith beyond negotiation. The new terrorism concept was mainly associated with Islamist terrorism and it has been argued that Islamist terrorists cannot be negotiated with reasonably. Although the terrorism threat had been high earlier on and continues to be high until this day, it can be said that terrorism after 9/11 became overestimated.

2.3. Overestimation of Terrorism: Terrorism and Coconuts

Overestimation of terrorism is frequently caused by irrational fears and societies’ fear of a terrorist attack is high. The danger of falling victim to a terrorist attack is thereby assessed wrongly. Statistics show that is more probable to die getting hit by a coconut or bitten by a shark than being killed in an attack by terrorists.³ But why do we assess terrorism so wrongly and frequently overestimate it? According to sociologist Paul Marsden, emotions are contagious. When others cry or laugh we are compelled to do likewise. The same counts for fears. Fears are contagious. Fears thereby belong to human nature. Our predecessors needed fear to guarantee their survival. Today the media also plays a role. Although statistics shown on TV or the web can be interpreted rationally, fears are irrational and images and headlines can provoke fears in many ways. Walter Krämer, an expert for statistics, explains the overestimation of risks.⁴ To him fears are contagious and can lead to mass panics. He states moreover that we underestimate those risks we take voluntarily. Risks that are beyond our control are especially threatening. Furthermore,  concerted incidents – incidents in which many people die suddenly – are especially fearsome. The problem of the overestimation of terrorism lies in the fact that the most dangerous consequences of terrorism are actually being ignored. Indirect consequences such as for example the limitation of individual freedoms can be much more detrimental to a society than the direct consequences of terrorism themselves.

2.4 Overestimation of Terrorism: Terrorism as Provocation

The overestimation of terrorism can lead to unintended consequences. The indirect yet important consequences of terrorism have also been described by Peter Waldmann.⁵ According to him, terrorism is a strategy of communication attempting to cause insecurity and terror among society but also sympathy and support. When the state overreacts to terrorism the strategy of provocation is successful and terrorist groups can hope to gather support from the population that does not accept the overreaction by the state. The danger for the state lies in developing from a democracy into a dictatorship that limits individual freedoms in order to fight terrorism. The Red Army Faction in Germany tried to provoke the German state into overreaction and many other examples illustrate how terrorist groups want to mobilize support as an indirect consequence of their acts.

2.5. Misinterpretation of Terrorism: Are Terrorists mentally ill?

Terrorism is frequently under- or overestimated. However, the factors driving radicalization are also commonly misinterpreted. For many people it is somewhat calming to imagine perpetrators of horrendous acts as mentally ill. Yet not everyone who becomes a terrorist is ‘crazy’ so to speak. While a couple of decades ago terrorism researchers assumed mental illness on the part of terrorists, this assumption has been corrected and no clear correlation between mental illness and terrorism has been found. Instead, terrorists are as mentally sound or ill as the rest of the population.⁶ Nevertheless, in the last years it has been found that so-called lone-wolves indeed often are psychologically unstable and this applies to right-wing terrorists just as much as for jihadists. In the end, the assessment has to be made case by case and an important question is whether an attack has been politically motivated. It is this political motivation that differentiates terrorism, for example, from crime. The assessment of this political motivation is also important for policy makers and society. On several occasions, terrorist attacks have been preliminarily assessed as a rampage perpetrated by an unstable individual. For example, in Germany especially right-wing terrorist attacks are often correlated with mental illness, such as the attack in Munich in the Olympia shopping centre in 2016. It was only later acknowledged that an extremist right-wing motivation stood behind the attack . The classification of an attack as perpetrated by a mentally ill person can trivialize the deed and ignore the embedment of the perpetrator in wider radical networks.

2.6. Misinterpretation of Terrorism: Are Terrorists uneducated and poor?

Next to the misinterpretation of terrorists as psychologically ill there is a certain bias to understand terrorists as disadvantaged. Quite often it has been assumed that poverty,
lack of opportunities or lack of education are reasons for resorting to terrorism. However, several study projects have been able to weaken these arguments. For example, some researchers observed that a high level of education can even be related to a more radical approach. Among the right-wing extremists in Europe there are individuals right from the middle of society, and separatist movements often operate in more prosperous regions. Even though separatism does not necessarily turn into terrorism, separatist movements often “form” a radicalization environment. The motivation for radicalization can be as diverse as the individuals themselves. Going through the biographies of radicalized individuals, a high variance can be noted. Osama Bin Laden originally came from an entrepreneurial family of multimillionaires from Saudi Arabia. Andreas Baader from the Red Army Faction had to leave high school and came into conflict with the law several times. Stephan B., the attacker of the Halle synagogue shooting in October 2019, was unemployed, railed at everything and everyone according to his own mother, and blamed “the Jews” for his situation. Millionaires’ son, highly gifted dropout and unemployed individual – looking for the common denominator is quite difficult and leads to the assumption that radicalization processes are as
individual as the radicalized individuals themselves. Among them there are the more or less
privileged, highly and little educated, wealthy persons as well as those fighting for survival.⁷

3. A look inside the Phenomenon

One reason for the misinterpretation of terrorism is the lack of information thereof. But although it is hard to access reliable information and data about terrorists because they operate in secrecy, it is nevertheless possible to identify patterns and gain insights into the inner life of terrorist organizations. In the following I will share some of the findings I collected while leading the research group ‘How ‘Terrorists’ learn’. These findings contribute to breaking up the black box of terrorism.

3.1. What is terrorism

Let’s firstly look at the definition of terrorism. Terrorism is an essentially contested concept. The debate on a definition has been described as the Bermuda triangle of terrorism research by Brian Jenkins. The problem is aggravated by the mingling of scientific and political discourses.⁸ That after September 11^th so called embedded experts investigated terrorism for the government getting their funding for example from defence ministries did not help the lack of agreement among scientists. Since the term was here rather seen in light of counterterrorism, it was used to demonize and delegitimize the opponent. In political discourses frequently one’s freedom fighter turnes into another’s terrorist. While the contested nature of the term implies that there will be no universal definition, there is nevertheless a perspective in mainstream terrorism studies that assumes that terrorism is a form of violence that can be differentiated from other forms of violence and that there are elements of a definition that can be used as a basis of discussion. One such element is the killing of civilians. However, criminals sometimes kill civilians too. An adding element would be the political purpose – terrorists kill civilians for political purposes. Yet again, the same can be said about states – states also kill civilians for political purposes. The opinions on the existence of state terrorism diverge, however recent events like the Ukraine war shed new light on the state terrorism term. An interesting definitional element is terrorism as a communication strategy that addresses different audiences – such as the enemy state, the enemy population of the own followers. These elements from some of the defining features of the terrorism term that help researchers to speak a common language inspite of ongoing disagreements about the phenomenon’s definition.

3.2. Painting a differentiated picture

The underestimation, overestimation and misinterpretation of terrorism is due to a lack of a differentiated picture. Instead of lumping different terrorisms together it makes sense to ask what for example terrorist organizations actually have in common and what not. David Rapoport, the pioneer of terrorism research, described different waves of terrorism in recent history – namely the anarchist wave from the 1880s to the 1990ies, the anti-colonial wave from the 1920ies to the 1960ies, the leftist wave from 1960 to 1990 and the religious wave since the 1980ies onwards.⁹ Each wave is characterized by its transnational spread and by certain doctrines and technologies. Each wave lasts approximately for one generation and the religious wave should correspondingly come to an end in the presence raising the question for what comes next. One possibility is that the right-wing movement constitutes a new fifths wave.¹⁰ Interestingly, when looking at the Right, many parallels to earlier waves become clear. Right-wing extremists share with anarchists the tactic of propaganda by deed – perpetrating spectacular attacks with the goal to wake up the sleeping masses. They share with the leftist wave the criticism of the elites. According to the vision of the great exchange propagated by Renaud Camus, capitalistic elites in the West want to exchange the white population with immigrants. And the right-wing extremists share with the religious wave the use of lone wolves and the perspective of peace as something unmanly. While different forms of terrorism generally share their war rhetoric and a claim for justice, seeing themselves as victims acting in self-defence, they differ in their ideological reference frames. This difference does not mean that terrorist groups act in isolation and are not embedded transnationally and historically as just shown. If we look at right-wing terrorism today, it can be metaphorically described as the grandchild of leftist terrorism, step child of religious terrorism and small brother of populist regimes. Right-wing extremists are not only widely embedded but also intentionally co-opt the discourses of other groups. So-called discourse piracies lead to GDR-Slogans, solidarity with Nelson Mandela or slogans for fighting climate change by right-wing extremists. The purpose of these discourse piracies for right-wing movements is to appear more moderate and to get accepted as belonging to the middle of society.¹¹ Some observers also describe the tactic of inversion used by the Right. They are blamed for using Nazi Symbols and they themselves cite the horrors of the holocaust. They are blamed for not accepting the constitution and they themselves invoke law and order in their rhetoric. While the lines between different forms of terrorism are clearly blurring in the present, as also becomes clear in protests consisting of leftists, rightists, conspiracy theoreticians or corona deniers, the variety of different forms of terrorism is high and it is key to understand commonalities and differences. Arguably, all extremisms are the same but the nuances are also important.  Even between terrorist groups among the same historical wave there can be differences and commonalities also leading to learning among groups. Sometimes terrorist groups thereby learn through direct exchange. The Provisional IRA for example learned a lot from the South African ANC. Members of the ANC went into the prisons in Northern Ireland and taught the IRA members that they can also win by peaceful means. While in Belfast, an interview partner told me that meeting members of the ANC was the decisive moment for him which eventually led to his change of mind. Ideas travel as the example of Northern Ireland illustrates, where Catholics are seen analogous to the blacks of South Africa and Protestants analogous to the whites of South Africa. While the IRA members learned from the ANC, they saw themselves in contradistinction for example to the Red Army Faction, claiming that they represent substantially more people and have a real cause in contrast to the RAF. Among the different Islamist groups there is also much room for disagreement. The Egyptian Gamaa Islamiya – the group responsible for the Luxor Massacre in the 1990ies – called for a ceasefire initiative in 1997 and its leaders published about 20 books explaining their change of mind. They also argued against the radicalism of Al Qaeda and stated the following in one of their books:

Improper interaction with reality is not limited to those who are defeated by it or
who are unaware of its facts; the matter extends to others who look at reality through a lens that is sometimes colored by their desires and sometimes by their anger. There are also those who rely on interpreting reality using erroneous interpretations; some might rely on a conspiracy-based interpretation of events and facts, while others might rely on a deterministic interpretation of the course of events on the basis of historical or economic determinism, or some other form thereof, as if life were a chemical laboratory.¹²

The Gamaa Islamiya no longer wanted to see life as a chemistry lab painted in black and white and clearly differentiated themselves from Al Qaeda’s radical course. Terrorist groups are capable of learning and they copy friends and enemies alike. Only by understanding their learning capacities and their tactical and strategic transformations as a result of learning can counterterrorism go beyond repressive measures that only provoke more violence and develop strategies of dialogue. The variety among terrorist groups is high and grasping that variety prevents the state and society alike from seeing terrorism in black and white. An understanding of terrorism itself is thereby a form of dialogue. Empathy without sympathy – as anthropologist Günther Schlee¹³ has put it – helps to open new channels for conflict resolution.

3.3. What do terrorist organizations have in common with other organizations?

Terrorist groups do not only differ from and resemble each other; they can also be compared to non-terrorist organizations. In one of their books on their revisions the leaders of the Gamaa Islamiya lament that one does not have two lives: “We cannot live two lives or live our years twice over so as to have one life in which to experiment and make errors and another in which to learn from our mistakes.”¹² When reading these sentences I thought of my research group. As field researchers we go into the field and collect experiences and afterwards we return behind the desk and analyse that experience. It surely feels like two different lives. What is important here is that many of the statements made by the Gamaa Islamiya leaders would be applicable to most of us or for example to leaders of business organizations raising the question: what do terrorist organizations have in common with other organizations and what differentiates them.

Thus, terrorist groups even have a lot in common with the organizations they are fighting. In the course of conflict, terrorist groups start resembling their enemies. The action-reaction logic of violence and counter-violence leads to a spiral of escalation through which the conflicting parties become more and more similar. The leaders of the Gamaa Islamiya for example read the literature of its enemies such as Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization’. They thoroughly studied their enemies’ literature and reflected on it. The Gamaa leaders generally had a lot of time for literature studies and reflection in prison. In one of their books they spell out the following reflection:

The best thing is to take time to think when you are somewhat remote from the struggle, and you are able to look over the whole map from a distance […] Those who work for Islam have been prevented from doing so over recent years under the pressures of the terrible persecution they have faced, and their activity has become simply action and reaction.¹²

Education and the production of knowledge in prison also characterized other organizations. Members of the IRA even formed reading circles in prison. Just like the members of the Gamaa Islamiya, they also came in contact with individuals with other opinions and world views. A certain openness – somewhat paradoxically achieved while in prison – and the emphasis on education is a further point that terrorist groups have in common with a variety of other organizations. Education and openness form the essence of universities or schools and most other institutions.

Additionally, intergenerational processes take place in terrorist groups that characterize for example business organizations alike. The leaders of the Gamaa Islamiya emphasize that during their belligerent past they were young and stupid. They have developed a sense of responsibility. Thus, they even admit in their books that they have made mistakes. It is one thing to admit a minor error but to lead thousands of people sometimes even into death and then declare ‘we were wrong’ also testifies the profoundness of the revisions of the Gamaa Islamiya leaders. These leaders uncovered the errors they were making and even identified obstacles to correcting their course. They argue in their books that many Muslim societies fall short of self-criticism, and “points of error multiply.”  Thus, “Human beings are enchanted by their own actions […] they consider that they have reached perfection in their works, and shortcomings or defects should not be sought within them.” A further obstacle identified by the Gamaa leaders surrounds the notion that leaders are excessively sanctified, and that such excess is unnecessary and counterproductive. Moreover, ignorance and fancy “obscure the truth of matters from man.” And man is often “hostile towards that of which he is ignorant.”¹⁶The leaders of the Gamaa Islamiya admitted their mistakes when they matured and saw their belligerent youth in a different light. Similarly, the leaders of the IRA argue that with their peace initiative they wanted to protect the youth from making the same mistakes. It has moreover been argued that in the case of the IRA it was precisely the mingling of different generations that facilitated the peace process. Intergenerational learning is key for business organizations that want to keep up with the times. Some terrorist groups have realized that as well.

Additionally, terrorist groups are organized in more or less hierarchical structures, have specific forms of communication and further organizational routines that equally characterize any other organization. Education, intergenerational processes and organizational structures are features which we find beyond terrorist groups. And yet, there are several elements that are unique about terrorism. What differentiates them from other organizations is their particularly clandestine environment. Thus, a major difference lies in the underground existence of terrorists. Martha Crenshaw for example writes that the “commitment to violence as a primary method of action condemns terrorist organizations to…operate clandestinely. Terrorist organizations are predominantly underground conspiracies, and their activities are governed by the strictest rules of secrecy”.¹⁷ Similarly, Michael Horowitz writes that “[t]hey are different from states because they exist in a constant state of war”.¹⁸ The existence in the underground and in a constant state of war mentally shapes members of terrorist organizations. These members often exhibit a strong sense of justice, claims for their own victimhood and an emphasis on their right to self-defence. Moral outrage can be found almost among all forms of terrorism and seems to be a specificity thereof.

4. Conclusion

Terrorism is a puzzle. It is difficult to take a look inside. As field researchers we try to do exactly that – gather findings about the inner life of terrorist organizations. We thereby encounter numerous obstacles but also opportunities. One such opportunity is that going into the field can substantially enrich the researcher. Field research can for example help the field researcher to realize his own normative assumptions. Thus, he or she can learn that even peace is an agenda. What is violence and what not is ultimately a political question. In a way field researching terrorism implies stepping out of one’s own normative context and to realize one’s own implicit normative assumptions. Furthermore, how the researcher is viewed by the interviewee influences the findings gathered and is influenced by many factors. The researcher’s profession, gender or nationality can substantially influence the interview. During my field research, Hamas members in Syria associated my nationality with Adolf Hitler, in Kurdish Turkey interviewees lamented Germany’s export of weapons to Turkey, in Egypt the Israeli flag served as a doormat to a hall where Egyptians demonstrated against the Lebanon war and in Colombia interviewees complained about the interventions of the International community. My nationality brought with it associations for my interviewees and hence implications for the course and content of the interviews. Nevertheless, this also contributed to my realization of my own normative biases.

Terrorism is a puzzle. Even if we overcome hurdles of communication access still is difficult making the terrorism phenomenon so puzzling. Interviewees are often afraid to talk about sensitive issues. State violence can usher in a culture of silence. And yet, simultaneously, many like to speak and to be listened to. The willingness to talk can however also lead to hopes and expectations the researcher can hardly fulfil. One danger lies in becoming used as an instrument for propaganda. A Hamas interviewee told me that Hamas makes peace with Israel to show the world that Israel does not want peace. He wanted me to carry propagandistic messages to Germany. Expectations of interviewees can lead to feelings of guilt on the part of the researcher. However, he or she must have enough distance not to feed propaganda discourses. At the same time the researcher cannot burden the interviewees for publication purposes. At the end the interviewees want a certain control over what they have said. The researcher has to balance these different coins of sensitive interviews. Terrorism is a puzzle. Anthropologist Günther Schlee has emphasized the importance of understanding and not forgiving violence. In his solution of the puzzle empathy without sympathy is necessary to break up the black box of terrorism and gather insights into this nebulous phenomenon. A member of the Italian Red Brigades once said that it is one thing to leave prison but another to break out of one’s mental prison. Our misinterpretations and biases about terrorism that emanate for example from difficulties of access to this underground phenomenon also constitute our mental prisons. The black box of terrorism can only be opened through an attempt of understanding rather than destroying the manifold similar and dissimilar organizations and their members.