In November 2025, Tonga witnessed its fifth election since sweeping reforms introduced a majority popularly elected parliament and, ostensibly, ended the King’s control over the selection of government.

Yet in the wake of that election, the new Prime Minister is a noble, the former Speaker Lord Fakafanua, who on 15 December 2025 defeated the outgoing incumbent, ‘Aisake Eke, by 16 votes to 10. That outcome is, in one sense, a sign of the enduring powers of the nobility, despite the democratic reforms of 2010. More importantly, it signals a further step in the reassertion of monarchic authority by King Tupou VI, after a troubled 2021-25 term of parliament during which key areas of government – defence and foreign affairs – were wrestled back from the control of elected representatives. The limits of the reforms of 2010 have now been starkly exposed.

Tonga went to the polls on 20 November 2025 to re-elect its 26-member legislative assembly. The country has 149 islands spread across a total exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of around 700,000 square kilometres. Three-quarters of its 100,000 people live on the main island of Tongatapu, where the capital Nuku’alofa is located.

Although the 2010 reforms expanded the number of popularly elected representatives from 9 to 17, they left nine representatives selected by the holders of the country’s 33 recognised hereditary noble titles. On the campaign trail, one of their number – Lord Vaea, the King’s brother-in-law, claimed that it was time for the nobility to resume their historic leadership role in Tonga. He has had his way. Not only is the Prime Minister now a noble, but so too are the Speaker and Deputy Speaker. The Crown Prince, Tupouto‘a ‘Ulukalala, has again been appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister for his Majesty’s Armed Forces.

The pro-democracy movement, which won sweeping victories in the elections of the 1990s and 2000s, no longer exists as a unified force. Since the death in office of veteran democracy activist and 2014-19 Prime Minister ‘Akilisi Pōhiva, what was once called the Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands has fragmented. On his deathbed in 2019, Pōhiva appointed a politician of Mormon faith as his successor, but his mostly Methodist cabinet ministers rejected that choice. Since then, the pro-democracy politicians have been plagued by personal rivalries, opening the door to the noble resurgence. Only four or five of the freshly elected MPs are known supporters of democracy. Only one woman was elected. She defeated the only female MP in the outgoing parliament. The new Prime Minister, who at 40 years of age is Tonga’s youngest ever, is the holder of one of the 33 noble titles, and he owns estates on the three main islands groups of Tonga: Tongatapu, Ha’apai and Vava’u. He is the King’s nephew and the Crown Prince’s brother-in-law. Of the 16 MPs who backed Lord Fakafanua in the secret ballot, ten were People’s Representatives, says Pōhiva’s daughter Teisa Pōhiva, who called this a ‘sad day for Tonga’s democratic reforms’.

Turnout was well down on previous elections. Less than half of Tonga’s 63,484 registered voters cast ballots in 2025. According to the Tongan Electoral Commission (TEC) figures, turnout has declined at every election since the 2010 reforms. It peaked at over 90% in 2010, but fell continuously over 2014, 2017, 2021 and 2025. Figures from before 2010 are not comparable with the later figures because of the shift from multi-member districts (in which eligible citizens had multiple votes) to first-past-the- post (with a single vote).

Part of the reason for the decline may be an inflation in the number of registered voters. The left-hand side of Figure 1 shows the official turnout data and, in the columns, an increase in the number of registered voters from just under 42,400 in 2010 to 64,707 in 2025. The right-hand side chart shows turnout instead relative to the 21+ voting age population using census figures, which was fairly flat over the 2005-2025 period. Some decline in turnout remains visible after 2014, but it is not as acute as is suggested by the TEC figures. The census data suggests that there were just over 52,000 eligible voters in Tonga in 2025, but there are close to 65,000 on the electoral register. The discrepancy is likely due to the large numbers of Tongans who have migrated overseas. The Electoral Act does not prohibit‘ a Tongan subject who is not resident in Tonga’ from remaining on the electoral register. Yet Tongans overseas cannot vote unless they return home.

Since the mid-19th century, Tonga has been a constitutional monarchy, or what legal scholar Guy Powles once called ‘a constitution under a monarchy’. Its 1875 foundational law formalised the King’s control over cabinet, whose ministers sat unelected in parliament alongside equal numbers of nobles and popularly elected People’s Representatives. The reforms in 2010 saw the Monarch give up the right to choose both the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The amended Constitution gives Cabinet ‘executive authority’ and makes Cabinet ‘collectively responsible to the legislative assembly’, but it also defines the term ‘executive authority’ to ‘exclude […] all powers vested in the King or the King in Council, whether by this Constitution, or any Act of the Legislative Assembly, any subordinate legislation, and Royal Prerogatives’. It left the King not only with powers of dissolution of parliament and with a veto over legislation, but also over appointments to the judiciary. Even the government’s own legal advisor, the Attorney-General, remained royally appointed. The 2014 Pursglove report concluded that the amended Constitution ‘can lay claim to being the most poorly structured and drafted Constitution of any Country in the Commonwealth.

Since the current Monarch ascended to the throne in 2012, even ceremonial powers have been hardened. The King and his Privy Council chose Tonga’s anti-corruption commissioner in 2024, its police commissioner in May 2025, and the chairman of its Electoral Commission in 2016. The Privy Council, where the King once sat with ministers, survived after the 2010 transition but now separated from cabinet, as a shadowy institution of dual power which leaves functionaries in the ministries uncertain of lines of executive authority. As Pursglove warned, ‘while the Ministry of Justice remains accountable to the people through Parliament, the Office of the Lord Chancellor and the Office of the Attorney-General are not publicly accountable and answer only to the King in Privy Council. This is contrary to the democratic principles upon which the new Constitution was founded’.

Tonga’s nobles are sometimes compared to European feudal lords or a landed aristocracy, but in fact they are beholden to the King. In the 19th century, King Tupou I defeated the rival dynasties of the Tu’iTonga and Tu’i Ha’atakulaua and abolished the old noble titles replacing them with a smaller group of hand-picked nobles whose loyalty is to the Tupou dynasty. What Lord Vaea sees as a resurgence of aristocratic leadership is therefore really a reassertion of royal power.

This is not the first time that a noble has assumed the prime ministerial portfolio since the constitutional amendments 15 years ago. Owing to the reconfiguration of parliament in 2010, popularly elected MPs had the potential to obtain control over government, … if only they could remain united. They did not. Despite the then King, George Tupou V, indicating a preference for a peoples’ representative to head the government, a noble Lord Tu’ivakanō, defeated Pōhiva in the first post-reform prime ministerial election by 14 votes to 12.

After he acceded to the throne in 2012, King Tupou VI refused to accept a merely ceremonial figurehead role. Pōhiva managed to become Prime Minister in 2014 by 15 votes to 11 with all of the nine noble MPs arrayed against him. The King subsequently pushed back against the democratic reforms introduced by his eccentric elder brother, particularly with regards to powers to ratify international treaties. In 2017, angered by his troubled relationship with the Prime Minister who he accused of ‘trespassing’ on royal authority, the King prematurely dissolved parliament. He was acting on the advice of the Speaker, Lord Tu’ivakano, who highlighted alleged government encroachment on royal prerogatives. It proved a rude awakening. Pōhiva’s Democratic Party was returned with an increased majority at the November 2017 polls, acquiring 14 of the 17 popularly elected posts. The defiant Pōhiva was triumphantly re-elected as Prime Minister, but he soon fell ill and died in office in September 2019.

Ever since, at least until now, Tonga’s Prime Ministers have been Peoples’ Representatives, but they have been required to pay ever more homage to the palace. After Pōhiva’s death, the former Minister of Finance Pōhiva Tu’i’onetoa assumed the prime ministerial portfolio, but he became a vigorous opponent of the pro-democracy faction, accusing them of seeking to dethrone the King. The reassertion of royal powers has been particularly striking feature of the 2021-25 parliamentary term. In the wake of the 2021 general election, Huakavameliku Siaosi Sovaleni was appointed as Prime Minister, this time with majority backing from the popularly elected MPs and with his main rival, former finance minister ‘Aisake Eke, aligned with the nobles bloc.

Sovaleni’s relations with the King soon deteriorated. In February 2024, King Tupou VI announced that he was withdrawing ‘confidence and consent’ from the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defence, leading the elected government to spend the rest of that year trying in vain to heal the rift with the palace. Sovaleni resigned as Prime Minister in December 2024 to avoid being ousted in a no-confidence vote, which had the backing of the King. He was replaced by the obsequious ‘Aisake Eke, who managed to cultivate closer relations with the palace than his predecessor. It was he who initially appointed the King’s son, Crown Prince Tupouto‘a ‘Ulukalala, as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence and passed legislation to transform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into ‘his Majesty’s Diplomatic Service’. This was apparently not enough to earn him the King’s favour to serve another term.

The new government will face challenges both on the economic and political fronts. Tonga’s economy relies heavily on remittances from migrants overseas, which are equivalent to around 44% of gross domestic product, and which held up strongly during the covid-19 pandemic. But these are dependent on continued outward migration, with implications for the domestic economy. Tonga owes China US$120 million, equivalent to around a quarter of annual gross domestic product. Having discharged little of that debt since the Chinese loans were first taken out in 2008, repayments have ballooned to around $US20 million per annum in 2024-25, more than the island kingdom spends on health services. To obtain funds to sustain social services, government has become even more reliant on foreign aid.

The Lord Fakafanua-led government is on the lookout for lucrative new sources of income from overseas, such as citizenship-by-investment schemes or passport sales. In the 1980s and 1990s, royal-appointed governments lost large sums of money in corruption scandals associated with these secretly approved schemes. It was a reaction to the lack of accountability and transparency under those governments that initially sparked Tonga’s democracy movement. Tonga’s long-suffering citizens may be faced with the uncomfortable choice of either tolerating similar indiscretions or rebuilding that movement.

The post The Limits of Democracy in Tonga Exposed in the Aftermath of the 2025 Election appeared first on Periscope.

10 May 2024

Facts & Figures

The Solomon Islands is an archipelago of more than 100 islands with 9 main island groups located in the south-west Pacific. The capital Honiara is based on the largest island, Guadalcanal. The population is estimated at over 700,000; predominantly Melanesian with small Polynesian, Micronesian, Chinese and European communities. Many Solomon Islanders make a living from farming and fishing. Whilst English is the official language, Solomons’ Pijin is most commonly spoken. As evidenced by the 2019 Census, the country is mainly Christian, with the Church of Melanesia having the most followers (about 32% of the population, up by 40% since 2009), followed by the Catholic Church (about 20% of the population, up by 42% since 2009).

In 1893, the British Government established a protectorate over the eastern group of islands, with Germany controlling most of the Western islands. Later on, the British protectorate was extended to cover the nine main groups of islands. Buka and Bougainville became part of German New Guinea and were eventually incorporated into Papua New Guinea. In 1976, the Solomon Islands were granted internal self-government. The island state became independent on 7 July 1978 and joined the Commonwealth of Nations.

The political system provides for a unicameral national parliament with 50 members being elected for four years term under a first past the post voting system. The prime minister is elected by a simple majority of members of the parliament. Party structures are fluid, meaning the formation of governments usually requires complex coalitions. There are also nine provincial assemblies, each of which is led by a premier.

Source (including more details): Solomon Islands country brief | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (dfat.gov.au)

Run up to the elections

The Solomon Islands has experienced turbulent times since the previous general elections.

In 2019, the then (now former) Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare decided to cut ties with Taiwan, enabling the country to resume diplomatic relations with China. At the time, people in the streets raised concerns about the decision, arguing a Christian country’s values were incompatible with those of an authoritarian state. In 2020, the province of Malaita, led by its former premier Daniel Suidani, held an independence referendum which the federal government dismissed as illegitimate. In 2021, riots broke out in Honiara, with protesters trying to storm the former PM’s residence and targeting predominantly Chinese businesses. Many of the protesters came from the island of Malaita, the most populous island, reportedly discontent with a perceived unequal distribution of resources and lack of economic support leaving their province as one of the least developed. Media also reported lingering dissatisfaction over the central government’s decision to turn their backs on Taiwan. The riots were ultimately brought under control with the assistance of peacekeepers from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

In 2022, the Solomon Islands entered into a security agreement with China. Whilst the terms of the final agreement are unknown, a draft was leaked on social media which raised the alarm bells in Australia, the United States, and other like-minded countries (see Digital Snapshot 6/22 SOLOMON ISLANDS – Security made in China and #8/22 SOLOMON ISLANDS – Australia’s Red Line in the Pacific for further details). In 2023, the United States reopened its embassy in Honiara, 30 years after it was closed. This did not prevent Sogavare from visiting China for the second time since 2019. Further, it did not prevent the former PM in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly from saying that the People’s Republic was his country’s lead infrastructure partner, and praising Bejing’s development cooperation as “less restrictive, more responsive and aligned to [his country’s] national needs”. He also ostentatiously skipped the 2^nd US-Pacific Forum in held Washington DC, sending the then foreign minister (now prime minister), Jeremiah Manele, instead. In the same year, the Solomon Islands hosted the 7th Pacific Games for which China donated seven stadiums and venues built by Chinese companies. In addition, the former PM postponed the election until a date after the Pacific Games (November 2023) on the ground that his country did not have the resources to host a major sporting event and elections at the same time.

General elections

The general (federal and provincial) elections were ultimately held on 17 April 2024.

The official (federal and provincial) election results may be found here. According to media reports, the former PM’s Ownership, Unity and Responsibility (OUR) Party has won 15 seats, meaning whilst the party remains the largest in parliament, no less than 18 of their former ministers lost their seats. The former opposition leader Matthew Wale’s Democratic Party has secured 11 seats. Peter Kenilorea, the son of the country’s first post-independence prime minister, achieved 6 or 7 seats for his United Party. Seven members of parliament-elect belong to smaller parties, amongst them Amoi Chachabule’s (a businessman from Marovo) Peoples First Party. Further, ten independent candidates were elected. In other words, no party has achieved the majority required to govern in their own right.

As for the reasons for the election outcome, experts seem to agree it is rather owed to economic factors than concerns about Chinese domestic influence. In the Lowy Institute’s words:

The economic downturn since 2020, and a major contraction in log exports to China, conflicted with Sogavare’s promises of considerable developmental gains arising from the new diplomatic disposition.

The ANU’s Development Policy Centre considers there to exist a historic relationship between economic performance and incumbents’ electoral fortunes. The country’s GDP per capita, we are told, had contracted considerably in recent years. Further, the Centre presumes that so called Constituency Development Funds (CDFs), ie largely government-funded monies which MPs may spend as they please, have fallen in real per capita terms.

New prime minister and cabinet

The selection of a new prime minister saw former PM Sogavare withdraw as a candidate, saying his government had been “under pressure from the United States and Western allies”, and that he had been “accused of many things”. His party backed former foreign minister Jeremiah Manele instead, who was ultimately elected by secret ballot as the country’s new prime minister, defeating his opponent Matthew Wale in a 31 to18 count. The new PM has meanwhile  announced the first 11 ministers of his new cabinet; another 12 ministers are expected to be sworn in shortly, including the minister of finance and treasury, infrastructure and development.

The Guardian describes PM Manele as “China-friendly”. Indeed, he was the foreign minister when the country cut its ties with Taiwan in 2019, and said that if elected he would continue the same foreign policy basis – “friends to all and enemies to none”. Following his election, PM Manele said that “the people have spoken” and called for calm. As per unofficial statements from diplomatic circles, the majority of people in the streets seem pleased with the new leader. This gives hope that the situation may remain calm for now.

Provincial elections

The outcome of the provincial elections is arguably no less important for the future of the Solomon Islands. This seems to apply, in particular, to the re-election to the provincial assembly of the former premier of Malaita. Whilst in office, Daniel Suidani not only spoke out openly out against closer ties with China but also refused to accept Chinese development assistance. He was also responsible for the province of Malaita’s 2020 independence referendum. As a result, he was removed from his position by way of a (reportedly orchestrated) non-confidence vote in February 2023. He was replaced by a pro-China administration led by Martin Fini, who lost his seat in the latest provincial elections.

In sum, whilst the federal elections are likely to result in a continuation of the former prime minister’s policies, both domestically and in terms of foreign affairs, there are still too many uncertainties to predict the direction the country will take from here.

Can Solomon Islands’ new prime minister really be friends to all?

The success of the PM’s premiership will depend on his approach to pressing domestic problems as much as issues of national sovereignty.

Jeremiah Manele: Pro-China candidate wins Solomon Islands PM vote

Jeremiah Manele has already indicated he will continue the Pacific nation’s close ties with Beijing.

New Solomon Islands PM Manele unveils first line up of ministers, more to be revealed soon

Eleven MPs were confirmed as ministers in the Government for National Unity and Transformation coalition on Saturday and another 12 are exepcted to be sworn in the coming days.

Solomon Islands bids farewell to a polarising PM who became the Pacific’s most China-friendly leader

Although Manasseh Sogavare’s time as prime minister of Solomon Islands is finished, his country’s relationship with China may still have some way to run

Solomon Islands elections: who won on the night and why? – Devpolicy Blog from the Development Policy Centre

There’s no evidence that Solomon Islands’ voters spurned the OUR party because its leader had become too friendly with China, says Terence Wood.

Solomon Islands’ pro-China leader Manasseh Sogavare withdraws from the race to be next prime minister

Solomon Islands’ pro-China leader, Manasseh Sogavare, has withdrawn from the race to be the next prime minister following the country’s national election.

Manasseh Sogavare – Master of Mayhem in the Solomon Islands – Australian Institute of International Affairs

In the Solomon Islands, an election in April will decide whether a Chinese allied prime minister keeps his job. Manasseh Sogavare has taken advantage of urban unrest in the past, but his security partners may be reluctant to assist in future.

Two female MPs in the Pacific have been replaced by their husbands, another demoted after alleged ‘sex scandal’

In the same week a prominent female Fiji MP was demoted after an alleged affair, two Solomon Islands female MPs announced they would not be contesting next month’s election. The kicker? They’d be replaced by their husbands.

Solomon Islands: Unexpected defeat for Sogavare

Sogavare was tipped for a sweeping victory but suffered a major defeat. Now Solomon Islands politicians must form a new government, and keep the peace.

The post Solomon Islands – 2024 General Elections appeared first on Periscope.

7 May 2024

The Australian government recently released their much-anticipated inaugural biannual National Defence Strategy (NDS) and experts across the country are currently going through the details to evaluate the good and the bad.

Building on the Defence Strategic Review (DSR), the NDS focuses on a restructure of Defence to allow for increased maritime, amphibious capabilities across all services in response to the current and predicted future threat environment. This environment, although it includes developments farther afield, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran-backed Hamas and other proxy operations in the Middle East, from an Australian perspective, still mainly focuses on developments closer to home. As Defence Minister Marles stated in his launch address: ‘Of course Australia is part of a larger world...But equally, the call for focus means that we simply have to make the difficult decision to keep the vast bulk of our effort in our region. This is what the world would expect of us...But far more significantly and importantly it is where our national interest unambiguously lies.’ The NDS, thus, places significant emphasis on regional partnerships and alliances, underpinned by ‘greater defence and technology cooperation’ with the US and the UK.

With an entrenched strategic competition between the US and China, increased investments by Indo-Pacific countries in sophisticated weapons, and short- and long-term consequences of climate change, including questions of food security, displacement and cross-border migration, there is a variety of challenges Australian policy-makers need to consider. As a result, the government intends to ensure that its Defence is fit for purpose.

As set out in the DSR, defending Australia and its national interests requires a new approach that is broader than the previous strategy that was predominantly focused on military defence. As a result, the government announced that its new NDS would be based on the underlying concept of ‘National Defence’. This concept will encompass a whole-of-nation approach to defence by including non-military considerations such as integrated statecraft, resilience of industry and supply chains, investments in innovative technologies, and boosting a skilled workforce.

In relation to the ADF, the government plans to evolve force structure, posture and preparedness in three distinct phases:

• Enhanced Force-in-Being (now until 2025): refers to immediate changes to the current force
• Objective Integrated Force (2026-2030): refers to the acquisition of critical capabilities
• Future Integrated Force (2032-beyond): refers to the implementation/completion of a fit-for-purpose ADF across all domains

The cornerstone of Defence planning in this context will be a ‘Strategy of Denial’, which aims to deter potential adversaries from taking action that would endanger Australian interests by making them doubt their ability to achieve their objectives at an acceptable cost.

‘Having the most capable Navy in our history’ will be at the heart of this Strategy of Denial. Apart from the much-discussed submarine acquisition, this will include the integration of a new range of missile systems into the Navy’s surface combatants.

Army and Air Force will also see new acquisitions to complement the maritime push. The Army will receive new High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, equipped with Precision Strike Missiles and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, thus, increasing its tactical range of 30 to beyond 500 kilometres. Meanwhile, the RAAF will receive longer range missiles for their Growlers, the Joint Strike Fighters and the Super Hornets. Continued development of hypersonic air-launched weapons is also foreseen in the NDS. The strategy further promises increased investment into Australia’s northern bases, as well as in drone and counter-drone, and cyber-related capabilities.

In order to maximise funding, reductions will be made to the number of new Infantry Fighting Vehicles, the planned acquisition of two large support vessels will be halted for now, and ‘$1.4 billion from planned enhancements to Defence facilities across Canberra’ will be re-distributed to operational bases in the north.

As was to be expected, reactions to the NDS vary, but so far, the overall feedback seems positive. On the negative side, the opposition accused the government of effecting defence budget cuts that would have negative consequences and vowed to increase spending if they were successful at the next elections. Some experts lament a lack of focus on climate change related threats, like displacement and food insecurity, while others criticise the NDS as a ‘failed response to China’. The biggest weakness, identified by experts across the board appears to be what defence expert Jennifer Parker describes as the ‘period of risk’, which stretches from now to the late 2020s/early 2030s, when the first new acquisitions are scheduled to come into action. This weakness, however, is generally understood as a result of bipartisan failure of consecutive governments to make financial commitments and recognise the necessary urgency for action, not as a fault of the NDS itself.

Apart from this main weakness, the general perception of the NDS appears to be that it is a solid strategy that clearly highlights a significant re-shaping of Australian defence planning. Andrew Carr, Senior Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, defining it as a shift away from declaring principles and towards diagnosing problems, while ASPI Senior Fellow David Uren describes the NDS as a significant achievement for Defence Minister Richard Marles. Other defence experts found ‘much to like’, as the NDS included ‘a solid analysis of Australia’s strategic environment’ and was accompanied by a comprehensive Integrated Investment Program. With both a defence strategy and a budget plan now in place, the next challenge will be the actual implementation of both.

2024 National Defence Strategy

Today, the Albanese Government has released the inaugural National Defence Strategy, which sets out a fundamentally new approach to the defence of Australia and our interests. Developed in response to last year’s Defence Strategic Review, the 2024 National Defence Strategy outlines the Government’s strategic framework to guide the significant and urgent changes required to address Australia’s challenging strategic circumstances.

Unpicking the government’s National Defence Strategy – ABC listen

Depending on where you sit the government’s National Defence Strategy – announced yesterday – is an indecipherable piece of puffery or transformational reforms designed to protect us in a much less certain world.

Former defence chief says government ‘doesn’t understand’ climate change risk to Australia’s security

Former military and intelligence leaders, including the former chief of Australia’s Defence Force, say the government has “astonishingly” forgotten the risk of climate change in its defence strategy.

National Defence Strategy: tackling problems, not just declaring principles | The Strategist

The release of the 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) in April revealed a dividing line within Australia’s strategic and defence community. The line is between Defence and the ADF, which have a new way of…

National Defence Strategy: Cancellations cover 22 percent of acquisition costs | The Strategist

Defence will continue to operate within a tight financial straightjacket as it executes the massive redirection demanded by last year’s Defence Strategic Review and the AUKUS program, with cuts to existing projects expected to make…

National Defence Strategy: a missed opportunity for space | The Strategist

Last week’s release of the National Defence Strategy (NDS) and its accompanying Integrated Investment Program (IIP) gave only passing mention to one of the most important operational domains for the Australian Defence Force—space. Altogether, they…

As warfare changes, so does Australian strategy

The National Defence Strategy is not as new as the government claims, but comes with welcome capability investments.

Australia plans for a ‘less certain’ future in Asia — one where the US may not remain the dominant force

The US talks of Aukus as ‘binding’ the allies for decades to come, but Richard Marles says Australia must become more ‘self-reliant’

Defence strategy fills gaps but misses holes

We need to move towards a wider conversation around national security and mobilisation, and be clear on the vulnerability in our capabilities until the late 2030s.

It will take too long, but we’re on right course

The new defence strategy and the accompanying investment plan unveiled by the Albanese government has both strengths and weaknesses.

Australia’s defence budget set to increase by $50 billion over the next decade

The federal government will spend an extra $50 billion on defence over the next 10 years under a new strategy.

Marles forced to revise Canberra’s take on far away wars

The Defence Minister has made it clear the government is going to stare down critics who want our troops turning up at every world trouble spot.

Minimise capability gap while waiting for the new fleet to surface

Ten years from now, Australia will have its most potent navy in decades. In the interim, it will have the least capable in more than half a century.

Marles’s 2024 National Defence Strategy another failed response to China threat

The Albanese government’s new defence strategy fails just as badly as previous documents, conflating two unreconcilable responses to China.

Defence strategy fills gaps but misses holes

We need to move towards a wider conversation around national security and mobilisation, and be clear on the vulnerability in our capabilities until the late 2030s.

Marles forced to revise Canberra’s take on far away wars

The Defence Minister has made it clear the government is going to stare down critics who want our troops turning up at every world trouble spot.

The post Australia’s National Defence Strategy appeared first on Periscope.

However, the discourse on this topic is confronted with three major problems: scientific espionage is challenging to grasp conceptually, hard to detect, and often operates in a legal gray area. Questions arise about what constitutes legitimate sharing of research results, what might be potentially illegitimate but not illegal information acquisition, and how this relates to espionage on behalf of a foreign state. These unresolved issues lead to a low awareness of risks and a high undisclosed number of incidents.

In a time of global power struggles, it is not surprising that powerful nations aim to strengthen their position in the global political system. In the competition for dominance, nations also resort to scientific espionage, aiming to capture innovations, undermine sanctions and export controls, and shift the financial risks of research and development onto others. China is not the only actor using scientific espionage for these purposes, but it currently leads in terms of the efforts to obtain and the scope of collected data. Even Russia and North Korea, known for comprehensive espionage activities, currently do not concentrate resources on espionage as targeted as China does. China’s scientific espionage activities can be closely linked to its strategic ambition to become the new world power by its 100th anniversary.

In most cases, scientific espionage is focused on dual-use research areas. In science, “dual use” refers to civilian research with a dual, namely military, purpose. In some fields of research, the dual-use-aspect is obvious, such as biochemistry, which is beneficial to human health but can also be used for chemical warfare agents. Or think of rocket technology, which enables us to explore space but can also be used for weapons. Dual-Use also includes areas that appear “neutral” at first glance, such as findings from materials research, nanotechnology, robotics, quantum technology and many more. These potentially affected research areas are regulated by export controls in most countries. However, the types of control regimes use are not sufficient to counter the dangers posed by scientific espionage. The decision on whether something falls into the dual-use category or not remains dependent on the assessment within research institutions. The responsibility for assessing the risks of research in a dual-use context is often delegated to individual researchers, who find themselves in an unresolved conflict: protecting sensitive research results while adhering to the ideal of research freedom, and facing individual motivations, such as promoting international collaboration for prestige, financial incentives, or better career opportunities.

Measures to protect research results are often considered contradictory to research freedom. However, the ideal of a free knowledge market has little evidence when closely examined. Research freedom is constrained by cultural practices, institutional regulations, and external pressures. It is obvious that the freedom of research is also influenced by the funding bodies (such as industry), which determine what research is carried out through their funding. The fragility of the ideal of research freedom is evident in scientific collaborations between Western countries and China. Two fundamentally different political and cultural systems with partly antagonistic value systems collide. While Western countries like Germany and Australia emphasize democracy, the rule of law, and the principle of research freedom, the scientific sector in autocratic China is closely intertwined with the state and the Communist Party. This is reflected in the hierarchical organization of leadership bodies at Chinese universities, where – unlike in Western countries – the party chief ranks higher in the hierarchy than the academic leader. This ensures that the research institution aligns with the party’s agenda. The strategy paper of the Communist Party known as “Document No. 9”, which was leaked in 2013, revealed that universal Western values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights are vehemently rejected by the CCP. This attitude also affects the Academic Freedom Index of the country, with China ranking among the worst ten percent in 2023 (see figure 1)

Figure 1: Academic Freedom Index Map

The need for financial resources compels research institutions to look for financially potent partners. This can undermine research freedom, as evident in Europe and Australia, especially considering that foreign investments inherently carry the potential for “foreign influence.” In the West, awareness of foreign influence, particularly with a focus on China, is growing and is sometimes even referred to as a central societal challenge of the 21st century. Simultaneously, there is a warning not to let the discussion devolve into xenophobia.

Regardless of whether one speaks of “foreign influence” or “scientific espionage”, research institutions and universities are often easy targets. The lack of awareness among individuals, the uncertainty about what knowledge is worth protecting, and the absence of a holistic security concept for protecting research results facilitate the work of so-called “non-traditional collectors” – students and visiting scholars from China who gather information deemed relevant by the People’s Republic during their professional activities.

Herein lies the dilemma, a tension between progress and security. Consequently, international research collaboration is also referred to as a double-edged sword: it is indispensable to keep a nation at the forefront of time, but it can also become a gateway for espionage.Scientific espionage not only leads to unfair competition, job losses, and weakening national security but can also have geopolitical consequences if one thinks of the military build-up in China and the current conflict between the People’s Republic and Taiwan. Moreover, research institutions affected by espionage face reputation damage and the loss of trust from society and sponsors. This dilemma needs resolution.

In the 2022-initiated study “Research institutions between the poles of freedom of research and protection of knowledge. Scientific espionage using the example of China”, the question was examined of how research institutions can protect themselves from scientific espionage. Using expert interviews, the study investigated how research institutions in Austria overcome the tension between protection against scientific espionage and the necessity of scientific exchange. The interviewees included individuals from the research sector, as well as experts from security authorities and intelligence services. Through qualitative research methodology, an inventory was generated, and recommendations were derived.

Similar to Sabine Carl’s findings for Germany in 2019, awareness of scientific espionage in research institutions in Austria was very low. Since risk awareness is a prerequisite for all subsequent measures, sensitization should occur at the following levels:

• Politics: The political commitment to knowledge protection forms the foundation, as it is a prerequisite for adequate resource allocation and the representation of the phenomenon in legislation.
• Authorities: The empirical study revealed that certain reservations exist among research institutions towards intelligence and security agencies. This is associated with an increase in the number of unreported suspicions. Therefore, authorities should actively work to reduce inhibitions.
• Research institutions: At both leadership and employee levels, there is often a prevailing understanding that protective measures hinder innovation in research. Striking a balance between enabling innovation and safeguarding knowledge from illegitimate access or misuse is essentially a risk management process. Only when university leaders and researchers recognize that risk management considers opportunities as well as risks can a productive approach to knowledge protection be ensured. Workshops and training sessions raise awareness of the dangers of scientific espionage.

The next step is the establishment of knowledge protection at the institutional level. To do this, a target analysis must be conducted regularly, identifying which research areas of an organization need protection. Only when precise knowledge is available about which scientific topics of the institution might be targeted for espionage can targeted measures be implemented. This includes identifying the “crown jewels”, which are the most sensitive or valuable research results. The result of the target analysis is reflected in cross-institutional protective measures, including monitoring and vetting processes. This means that scientific collaboration is assessed in terms of its potential risks, which can be derived from the research goal, the orientation of the partner university, and the background of the foreign researcher. In order to identify threats and espionage potential, it is also necessary to look at the interests of other nations. Since it is hardly reasonable to expect researchers or research organizations to inform themselves about the national interests of partner countries in addition to their scientific work, security authorities and intelligence services should provide support here. However, it must be clear where the limits of their areas of competence are in order to avoid giving the impression of censorship: While the security authorities and intelligence services can pass on their expertise regarding threats and espionage methods to the research institutions, the latter must be able to remain autonomous in deciding which fields of research are sensitive. Individual researchers cannot be required to identify and assess the risks of their own research, as this would place them in a conflict of interest. Internal legal and ethics department expertise should be involved in this evaluation.

The implementation of an information security management system is a technical measure for securing research results. This includes ensuring basic IT security, sandboxing, using multi-factor authentication, and introducing access and entry restrictions. To counter the prejudice that such security measures inhibit creativity, it may be helpful to introduce an innovation management process, for example, based on the Stage-Gate process by Cooper A process-oriented approach ensures finding synergies, quality assurance, and information security. Research projects are divided into individual, sequentially structured project phases with different security levels. While openness is significant in the initial phase to stimulate exchange between researchers and foster innovation, the need-to-know principle restricts access to information towards the end to prevent endangering the exploitation of results.

The majority of individuals interviewed in the empirical study shared the assessment that scientific espionage will increase in the future. Therefore, a clear strategy for dealing with this risk is needed. In the course of upcoming research projects, particular attention should be paid to emphasizing practical relevance. How research institutions can develop appropriate protective measures, tailored to their size, orientation, and available resources, should be investigated. The result of these efforts should be a modular knowledge protection concept that is standardized but can be adapted to the needs of stakeholders and aims at synchronizing the efforts of individual stakeholders.

Bibliography

Australian Government (Hg.) (2024): Department of Home Affairs Website. URL: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/countering-foreign-interference/defining-foreign-interference (02.01.2024).

Boyd, Dallas/Lewis, Jeffrey G./Pollack, Joshua H. (September 2010): Advanced technology acquisition strategies of the People’s Republic of China.

Cooper, Robert G. (1990): New products: The key factors in success.

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft e.V./Deutsche Akademie der Naturforscher Le-opoldina e.V. (2014): Wissenschaftsfreiheit und Wissenschaftsverantwortung. Empfehlungen zum Umgang mit sicherheitsrelevanter Forschung.

Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (2022): Tackling R&I foreign inter-ference. Staff working document, Luxembourg.

Eckert, Till u. a. (18.05.2022): Chinesisches Militär made in Germany. Wie Deutschland China hilft, zur Militär-Supermacht aufzusteigen, in: correctiv. URL: https://correctiv.org/aktuelles/wirtschaft/2022/05/18/wie-deutschlands-wissenschaft-china-hilft-zur-militaer-supermacht-aufzusteigen/ (18.5.2022).

Eftimiades, Nicholas (2020): A series on chinese espionage. Operations and tactics, [Etats-Unis].

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2019): Case Example: Non-traditional collectors, URL: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-case-example-insulation-2019.pdf (04.12.2022).

Feldwisch-Drentrup, Hinnerk (12.03.2020): Spionage durch China: Deutschlands gefährliche Naivität, in: WELT. URL: https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/plus206504433/Spionage-durch-China-Deutschlands-gefaehrliche-Naivitaet.html (12.3.2020).

Fitzgerald, John (2017): Academic Freedom and the Comteporary University. Lessons from China. In: Humanities Australia Journal, S. 8–20. URL: https://www.humanities.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/AAH-Academy-Lect-Fitzgerald-2016.pdf (02.01.2024).

Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg; V-Dem Institute (Hg.) (2023): Academic Freedom Index. Update 2023. URL: https://academic-freedom-index.net/research/Academic_Freedom_Index_Update.pdf (25.01.2024).

Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg; V-Dem Institute (Hg.) (2023): Academic Freedom Index (AFI). URL: https://academic-freedom-index.net/ (02.01.2024).

Hamilton, Clive/Ohlberg, Mareike (2021): Die lautlose Eroberung. Wie China west-liche Demokratien unterwandert und die Welt neu ordnet., 6. Aufl., München.

Joske, Alex (2018): Picking flowers, making honey, URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/report/picking-flowers-making-honey (07.06.2022).

Kirchmeir, Daniela (2023): Forschungseinrichtungen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Forschungsfreiheit und Wissensschutz. Wissenschaftsspionage am Beispiel China. URL: https://pub.fh-campuswien.ac.at/obvfcwhsacc/content/titleinfo/8865231 (25.01.2024)

Mansted, Katherine (2021): The Domestic Security Grey Zone. Navigating the Space Between Foreign Influence and Foreign Interference. Canberra: National Security College.

Roper, Carl (2014): Trade secret theft, industrial espionage, and the China threat. Boca Raton.

Sismondo, Sergio (2010): An introduction to science and technology studies. 2nd ed. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K., Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Zenglein, Max J./Holzmann, Anna (2019): Evolving made in China 2025. China’s industrial policy in the quest for global tech leadership., in: MERICS Papers on China, Nr. 8.

The post Research institutions between the poles of freedom of research and scientific espionage appeared first on Periscope.

The post Mag. Daniela Kirchmeir MA appeared first on Periscope.

09 November 2023

‘Before the election, we said to the Australian people we would work to stabilise the relationship with China without compromising our sovereign interests. And that’s what we’ve done.’

– Foreign Minister Penny Wong

After his visit to the USA at the end of October, which, according to White House Indo-Pacific Co-ordinator Kurt Campbell, has “given Australia and the United States a boost for dealing with China”, PM Anthony Albanese travelled to the PRC this week. The visit had been much anticipated, being the first visit of an Australian PM to China since 2016, and, for added weight, it was timed to coincide with the 50th anniversary of PM Gough Whitlam’s historic visit to the country in 1973. The Australian government had tried to lower expectations on the Chinese side prior to the visit as a result, with Albanese stating that there would be ‘no room for non-government engagements’ and that ’just opening up that engagement’ would be seen as an achievement.

In what media outlets referred to as an ‘18-month stabilisation campaign’, the Australian government carefully laid the groundwork to frame the visit in the correct light. An endeavour that appears to have been reciprocated on the Chinese side, as both governments made noticeable concessions prior to the actual event. Most notable among these were China’s decision to release Australian journalist Cheng Lei, who had been detained for three years, and its lifting of trade bans on a series of Australian products. Very timely, the All-China Journalists Association (ACJA) in Beijing, in cooperation with the Melbourne-based Asia Pacific Journalism Centre, also arranged a ‘closely guided eight-day tour’ for four Australian journalists to China, three weeks before Albanese was due to visit. Meanwhile, on the Australian side, the government announced in October that Chinese company Landbridge would be allowed to keep its lease of the Port of Darwin – something Anthony Albanese had previously criticised as a ‘grave error of judgment’. This perceived positive re-framing led advocacy groups to urge the PM not to forget about persisting human rights violations for the sake of improving bilateral relations. In answer to these concerns, Albanese stated that ‘We disagree on the basis of our political systems, on issues like human rights, on issues such as access to the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Straits, we think that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, allowing for that free flow of trade through those waterways are very important for Australia. […] and we’ll put those positions strongly, clearly and directly to China.’ In this context it is important to note that on the Australian side, recent developments have been referred to as a ‘stabilisation’ of the relationship not as a ‘reset’.

Both China and Australia regarded the visit as an opportunity to raise issues of concern to their respective national interests. Australia was hoping to make progress in its efforts to secure the release of detained Australian writer Yang Hengjun, who has been imprisoned in China since 2019, and eliminate the last remaining trade bans, including on wine, lobster and blacklisted abattoir exports. China was hoping for Australia’s support of its application to join the CPTPP and an easing of restrictions on Chinese investment in the Australian resources and renewable energy sectors.

The visit was divided into two parts, with a predominantly economics focused stop at the China International Import Expo in Shanghai and political meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang in Beijing. Despite the thematic split between economy and politics, the Australian government firmly stated that Australia would not return to treating security and economic issues separately in the context of bilateral relations.

In his first speech after his arrival in Shanghai, Albanese repeatedly emphasised that both nations had ‘prospered thanks to the certainty and stability that is made possible by rules-based trade’. This has been interpreted as an implicit rebuke of China’s rather blunt tactics in relation to its recent trade stoush with Australia. Albanese further stressed that it was a government’s role to create the ‘right conditions for business’ and to eliminate ‘unnecessary barriers to trade and investment by fostering a level playing field and by working towards inclusive economic growth’. On the Chinese side, the Australian government was praised for its commitment to more effective relations with China, but Albanese was also warned ‘not be kidnapped by the United States in his relations with Beijing’.

It was clear from official comments that China would like to secure Australia’s support for its application to join the CPTPP. When asked if his government was considering providing this support, Albanese gave an evasive answer, merely stating that ‘any country must demonstrate that it can meet the high standards of the agreement’ and that all applications to join the CPTPP would be ‘dealt with in an appropriate way’. As experts expected, this ‘failure to push back more forcefully’ on China’s ambitions to join the partnership sparked concerns in Japan, which reiterated that it would not tolerate China joining the pact.

Summing up his meeting with President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Monday, Albanese stated that it was ‘one of goodwill’, in which they discussed issues pertaining to trade and ‘the importance of stability in the region’. Albanese also mentioned that he ‘raised consular and human rights issues’ but did not go into detail on what exactly had been discussed. President Xi lauded the talks as a ‘new starting point for Sino-Australian relations’, but as he is in desperate need of positive narratives for his own national approval rating, he was expected to apply ‘smile diplomacy’ throughout the visit.

In a ‘Statement of Joint Outcomes’, the leaders confirmed their support for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, agreeing that ‘we should not be defined by our differences, recognise that they are there, but also recognise the mutual benefit that we have’ and that ‘the wise navigation of differences is an important element of strengthening our relationship’. In keeping with this theme, they announced the resumption of annual talks between leaders, ministers and officials. They also agreed to introduce ‘three to five year multi-entry visas for visitors and business people on a reciprocal basis’.

Although Albanese’s visit on the whole was more of a symbolic gesture rather than an occasion for policy-making – some referring to it as an ‘elaborate choreography of rapprochement’ – for now, it appears to have been effective in its intention of paving the way for a kind of working stability. However, as issues such as China’s poor human rights record, its territorial claims in Taiwan and in the South China Sea and its efforts to increase its influence in the Pacific region remain unchanged, any stability might be temporary.

Post-Visit:

Statement on joint outcomes of the China-Australia annual leaders’ meeting | Prime Minister of Australia

Press Conference – Beijing – People’s Republic of China | Prime Minister of Australia

ANTHONY ALBANESE, PRIME MINISTER: We’ve just concluded two very successful meetings. Firstly, I met with Chairman Zhao, the equivalent of our Speaker in the National People’s Congress. That was an important meeting to discuss the bilateral relationship, and to discuss future cooperation, including e…

Press Conference – Beijing – People’s Republic of China | Prime Minister of Australia

ANTHONY ALBANESE, PRIME MINISTER: Well, it is wonderful to be here in Beijing following a very successful visit in Shanghai. The trade fair yesterday was a real highlight. Some 250 Australian businesses. What it shows is that trade is about Australian jobs. And that’s what my Government is about. A…

Opening session of the China International Import Expo | Prime Minister of Australia

Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Your Excellency Li Qiang.

‘A handsome boy from Australia’ and an invite for the president: The key takeaways from Albanese’s China visit

Anthony Albanese is wrapping up in China after a whirlwind three-day trip aimed at stabilising ties between the two countries. From an invite to Australia to symbolism and plenty of talk about friendship, these are the key takeaways from the visit.

‘Handsome boy’: Albanese, Xi to resume annual talks

An agreement to restore dialogue between Australian and Chinese leaders, ministers and officials represents culmination of 18 months of diplomacy by both sides.

Two proverbs tell the story of two leaders trying to put bygones behind them

Xi Jinping chose a Chinese proverb about gratitude to welcome Anthony Albanese to Beijing — a reference to diplomatic ties forged by Gough Whitlam. But 50 years later another is equally apt: let sleeping dogs lie, writes David Speers.

China hails ‘new starting point’, Albanese, Xi stabilise relations

Australia and China are poised to resume the annual dialogue between leaders, Anthony Albanese has hinted following his historic meeting in Beijing on Monday night with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Albanese to echo Whitlam as he prays for a good harvest in Xi talks

The prime minister will visit the Temple of Heaven in Beijing on Monday morning before a significant meeting with China’s president, Xi Jinping

A smiling Xi is a wolf warrior in sheep’s clothing

The Chinese president’s retreat from wolf warrior to a smiling diplomat was on full display when he met Anthony Albanese, but how long will that last?

‘At a new starting point’: Albanese invites Xi to Australia after historic summit in Beijing

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has invited Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Australia during a “very successful” meeting in Beijing.

Nice to be in good books with Beijing but the catch remains

Subscribe to The Australian to get unrestricted digital access, home paper delivery, Apps for iPad and Android, member only +Rewards and much more…

Albanese arrives in China for landmark visit, says it’s in ‘our national interest’

Albanese will meet Chinese president Xi Jinping and premier Li Qiang, on the first visit to China by an Australian prime minister since 2016

Albanese offers gentle rebuke over China’s ‘unnecessary barriers to trade’ at Shanghai expo

Australian prime minister pushes the benefits of ‘rules-based trade’ after a period of unilateral sanctions imposed by China

Albanese advises China to play fair on trade

Anthony Albanese said China has a duty to itself and the region to practise free and fair trade, and expressed confidence Beijing’s remaining sanctions on Australian exports will be lifted.

China warns PM don’t be ‘kidnapped’ by US interests

China says Albanese’s visit is a chance to reset relations but remains worried Washington is pulling the strings.

Between Chinese grandeur and Australian pragmatism

Paul Keating may have been the first Australian PM to visit China “and remain level-headed throughout”. Anthony Albanese will crave a similar tick of approval.

Albanese leaves door open for China to join transpacific trade pact

Subscribe to The Australian to get unrestricted digital access, home paper delivery, Apps for iPad and Android, member only +Rewards and much more…

Anthony Albanese lands in China for talks with Xi Jinping

Subscribe to The Australian to get unrestricted digital access, home paper delivery, Apps for iPad and Android, member only +Rewards and much more…

Pre-Visit:

Australia’s opportunity to help China be mindful of the society of states | The Strategist

At their press conference last week, US President Joe Biden recounted to Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese a conversation he’d had with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Xi asked him why the US was ’working so…

Openly discussing differences can help stabilise Australia–China relations | The Strategist

Appreciation of differences, more so than of common interests, is essential to maintaining most meaningful relationships over time. It’s odd and a bit unfortunate, therefore, that common interests often limit the frame of reference for…

PM must not play Xi Jinping’s trade games

Anthony Albanese needs a philosophical framework that avoids sovereignty and international law being traded for economic rewards.

Penny Wong urges China to act responsibly as Australia moves to stabilise ties with Beijing

Subscribe to The Australian to get unrestricted digital access, home paper delivery, Apps for iPad and Android, member only +Rewards and much more…

‘Maybe I just miss being called a bogan’: From a Hong Kong jail, Gordon Ng writes fondly about his home in Sydney

Hong Kong community and human rights advocacy organisations are calling on Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to use his upcoming visit to China to advocate for a detained Australian citizen.

Biden’s Indo-Pacific chief talks of ‘renaissance’ between Australia and US

Kurt Campbell also revealed that the US had issued stern warnings to the Chinese regime against further intrusions into the Philippines’ maritime territories.

Australia tries to lower Chinas expectations ahead of Albanese meeting with Xi

Subscribe to The Australian to get unrestricted digital access, home paper delivery, Apps for iPad and Android, member only +Rewards and much more…

Television Interview – ABC Insiders | Prime Minister of Australia

DAVID SPEERS, HOST: Prime Minister, thanks so much for giving us some time here in Washington.

PM wants a ‘no surprises’ relationship with China

Anthony Albanese promises frank exchanges on his visit to Australia’s largest trading partner, with each country knowing where the other stands.

How the WTO helped Australia repair its trade ties with China

Australia’s resistance to Chinese coercion helped win the trade war, but the international trade organisation’s role should not be underplayed.

As Beijing beckons, the fight for Albanese’s ear on China

As Anthony Albanese prepares to meet Xi Jinping, two schools of policy in Canberra are competing to steer the PM’s approach.

Albanese prepares to visit China

Fresh from his visit to the US, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is preparing to pivot to his next mission, a trip to China.

Labor’s re-engagement with China

Preparations are under way in China for Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit, but optimism for a restoration of ties is clouded by concerns about Australia’s policy alignment with the US.

The ‘drums of war’ are receding, but Anthony Albanese still faces many uncertainties on his trip to China

There are limits around what Australia might hope to achieve and what it should expect in Beijing, but there is room for cooperation.

Albanese’s twin trips a balancing act on US and China

Anthony Albanese’s visits to Washington and Beijing will inevitably make the Australian PM a conduit and sounding board for both Joe Biden and Xi Jinping.

Visit to the People’s Republic of China | Prime Minister of Australia

The post Ensuring a stable and productive relationship? appeared first on Periscope.

23 October 2023

New Zealand has held general elections on 14 October. According to the preliminary election result, the centre-right party has achieved 39% of all “ordinary” votes, (50 seats – 17 more than 2020), followed by the Labour Party with 27% (34 seats – 31 less than 2020), the Green Party with 11% (14 seats – 4 more than 2020), the ACT Party with 9% (11 seats – 1 seat more than 2020), the NZ First Party with 6.5% (8 seats – 8 more than 2020 as the party back then did not meet the 5% threshold) and the Maori Party with 2.6% (4 seats – 2 more than in the last election). The voter turnout is estimated at about 78% (compared to about 82% in 2020). Voters abroad could cast their vote since 27 September; voters in the country could cast their vote since 2 October – about 1.15 million voters made use of this option (compared to about 1.98 million in 2020 and about 1.24 million in 2017). Notably, the so called “special votes” (including overseas votes) are estimated at 567,000 (20.2% of all votes) (compared to 504,621 in the last election), with the overseas votes estimated around 80,000.

If this were to be the final election result, there would be 121 seats in parliament, including one overhang seat. This, in turn, would mean that the National Party could govern in coalition with its traditional coalition partner, the ACT Party (evolved from the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers), led by David Seymour. There are 2 factors that could change the final election result. First, the “special votes” could make a difference, at least if most overseas voters had voted again as they usually do, namely for Labour or another party from the left spectrum of politics. Given that many of the overseas voters would have been locked out of the country during the pandemic, they might however have opted to give their vote to another party this time. Secondly, following the death of one of the candidates (Neil Christensen from the ACT Party), a by-election has been scheduled for the electorate of Port Waikato. If the National Party were to lose a seat, or if there were to be an additional overhang seat, the party would additionally depend on the support of the New Zealand First Party, led by Winston Peters. Accordingly, National Party leader Luxon has commenced coalition negotiations with both parties.

What does this mean for New Zealand?

According to the National Party’s election slogan, the party aims to bring New Zealand “back on track”. What this means may be taken from Mr Luxon’s election campaign speech, in which he promised that his party if elected would

• Fix the economy (by lowering inflation and growing the economy)

• Finance – Implement tax cuts
• Infrastructure – Build infrastructure through its Roads of National Significance policy
• Legal system – Restore law & order (eg by introducing boot camps for serious young offenders and stronger sentencing)
• Education – Lift school achievement through an enforced hour of reading, writing and maths, alongside banning mobile phones and regular assessment)
• Health – Cut health waiting times by training more health workforce
• Seniors – Support through the Winter Energy Payment and increasing Super every year
• Environment – Net zero emissions by 2050

The ACT Party wants the “change of government to be a government of change” and aims to

• Slash wasteful government spending
• Enforce consequences for criminals
• End divisive race-based policies

The election campaign of all parties was dominated by domestic topics, including the economic recovery from the pandemic and the cyclone that hit hard the North Island earlier this year. Of all domestic issues, there is one that sticks out from an outsider’s viewpoint: The Treaty of Waitangi, the question of its interpretation, and thus the role of Maori in the country. New Zealand has a population of about 5 million people, including about 17% Maori (compared to 3.8% indigenous people in Australia). Next to English, Maori is one of 3 official languages (with sign language being the third official language). There are 2 language versions of the Treaty. In the English version, the Maori give the British Crown ‘absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of sovereignty’ over their lands but are guaranteed ‘undisturbed possession’ of their lands, forests, fisheries, and other properties. Interestingly, the wording seems to bear resemblance to the relationship in the German legal system between the owner (Eigentümer) and the tenant (Mieter) of rental property. In the Maori version of the Treaty, the Maori give the Crown ‘kawanatanga katoa’ – complete governorship. And they are guaranteed ‘tino rangatiratanga’ which translates into self-governance or the unqualified exercise of chieftainship over their lands, dwelling places, and all other possessions.

There are calls for the principles of the Treaty to be implemented into legislation. Likewise, there are calls for the country to be renamed into “Aotearoa” (land of the long white cloud), or at least for its Maori name to be added to the official English name. The Supreme Court of New Zealand has recently confirmed the relevance of Maori law (tikanga) to the country’s legal framework (Peter Ellis case). The country’s tertiary education sector, more precisely, the law schools, must soon include Maori law with their curricula. These measures, alongside the concept of called co-governance (eg Waikato River Authority) and the priority given to Maori (and Pasifika) people in the health system (at least in Auckland with a population of 2 million, including a Pacific diaspora of about 200,000), are debated controversially. The National Party leader has made it clear that he would not generally oppose a referendum on the Treaty of Waitangi. On the other hand, Luxon left no doubt that he was opposed to co-governance, a separate Maori health authority and that priority be given in the health system to one ethnic group of the population, saying he would make decisions on the basis of the national good rather than on ethnic grounds.

In terms of foreign policy, the new government will have to decide on the continued support of Ukraine, its approach to the conflict between Israel and Palestine and, most likely, the question of whether to join the so called “second pillar” of the AUKUS Partnership Agreement entered between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the USA. This pillar involves the sharing of information in new cutting-edge defence technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and cyber capabilities. New Zealand is already a member of the Five Eyes intelligence network, joining AUKUS would mean an even greater integration in this space but could potentially jeopardise its relationship with the (nuclear free) Pacific region.

The final election results will be released on 3 November.

From selling deodorant to running the country: New Zealand’s new PM, Christopher Luxon

He is a former Air NZ chief executive, millionaire and committed Christian, but Luxon remains a bit of an enigma

Polls apart: NZ and Germany interpret MMP quite differently

With 16 federal states, each conducting its own parliamentary election – most with five-year terms – there is roughly one MMP election somewhere in Germany every three months. writes Oliver Hartwich

New Zealand’s 10th MMP General Election – New Zealand Parliament

The 2023 General Election on 14 October will mark a democratic milestone as New Zealand votes in its 10th MMP election.

The 2023 Election in New Zealand and its Foreign Policy Implications – Australian Institute of International Affairs

Foreign policy has yet to feature significantly in New Zealand’s elections despite its obvious implications for national security and development. Internationally, observers are looking for the elections will mean for policy towards AUKUS, the Ukraine War, and crucially climate change.

The defence dilemma facing NZ’s next government: stay independent or join ‘pillar 2’ of AUKUS?

Does New Zealand have more to lose than gain by joining ‘pillar two’ of the AUKUS security pact? The next government will have to decide, with serious implications for the country’s foreign policy.

New Zealand elections: Working together or co-governance?

The two main parties have never been so divided on issues from Māori reparations to renaming the island nation.

Who Will Be New Zealand’s Next Foreign Minister?

Whatever the results of the October 14 election, get ready for some new faces.

Co-governance explained and defined – by politicians

Co-governance has been a hot button issue this election year but what does it actually mean?

Peter Ellis: Supreme Court decision reaffirms tikanga relevance to legal framework

Analysis – Legal experts say the weighing up of tikanga Māori in the decision to posthumously exonerate Peter Ellis of child sex offences marks a seismic moment in the country’s legal history.

New Zealand starts giving priority to Māori and Pacific elective surgery patients

Ethnicity being used as a factor to determine waitlists in a bid to combat racial inequalities in health outcomes

New Zealand National Party | History, Policies, & Facts

Overview of the New Zealand National Party, which supports free-market economic policies and draws votes heavily from suburban and rural districts.

Two parties, two understandings: What does the Treaty of Waitangi mean?

For many reasons, what Māori and British actually agreed to in the Treaty has been unclear.

English and the official languages of New Zealand | New Zealand Immigration Concepts

Read our article and access more information, answers to questions, or blogs relating to visas, job search and investment in New Zealand.

The post New Zealand “Back on Track”? appeared first on Periscope.

04 August 2023

In November 2022, the Australian Senate established the Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media to examine the risk of foreign actors using social media platforms to interfere with democratic processes in Australia. The committee is made up of five full members, including representatives of the Liberal, Labor and Greens parties, and a number of participating (non-voting) members. It is chaired by Liberal Senator James Paterson, a known national security hawk and China critic, with Labor Senator Jess Walsh as Deputy Chair. In March this year, the committee received a briefing from government agencies, in April and July it held a series of public hearings. This week, the committee handed down its final report.

According to the report, ‘foreign interference is now Australia’s principal national security threat which risks significantly undermining our values, freedoms and way of life’. In the context of social media, the concern is that platforms are used to ‘pull and push information in four ways’: firstly, to gather intelligence on individuals, secondly, to collect behavioural data, thirdly, to intimidate members of diaspora communities and, fourthly, to influence societal and decision-making processes through disinformation campaigns. The recent increase in AI-enabled services was found to make these operations easier.

The biggest threat, as mentioned in the report, is posed by authoritarian regimes – China and Russia are both explicitly named – that do not allow open and free discussions in their own countries but use the freedom in other countries to influence public debates to ‘corrupt our decision-making, political discourse and societal norms’. To this end, the committee found, it made no difference whether the media platforms used were based in authoritarian countries or in liberal democracies.

At the same time, the committee clearly highlighted that not all social media platforms are the same. The issue of where it is based does make a difference when it comes to a platform’s willingness to cooperate with government inquiries and the question of legislating its usage. Even though platforms like Facebook’s parent company Meta and YouTube have been criticised for not being attentive or responsive enough, they still actively disabled or terminated accounts and channels running influence operations. In contrast, platforms ‘run in and run from authoritarian countries’, like TikTok and WeChat, were found to pose a ‘unique national security risk’ due to their lack of transparency and their general inability or unwillingness to cooperate with government inquiries.

Meta, Twitter, Google and YouTube all appeared in front of the committee in the course of the inquiry. TikTok also fronted the committee but was found to be unable to provide required information, for example, on how often data gathered by the company was accessed from overseas, and reluctant to provide witnesses. WeChat refused to appear before the committee and has been accused of providing ‘disingenuous answers to questions in writing’. Senator Paterson commented that this behaviour ‘demonstrated contempt for the parliament of Australia’.

According to media reports, the Chinese Embassy in Canberra has complained to DFAT about the Senate inquiry. Particularly the labelling of WeChat’s non-appearance in front of the committee as ‘contempt for parliament’ caused offence, as the committee is unable to compel foreign entities to participate in a hearing. Senator Paterson commented that this complaint said ‘everything you need to know about WeChat’s close connections to the Chinese Communist Party’ and that ‘the Chinese government’s displeasure with the work of the select committee will not deter us from completing our important work’.

Overall, the report lists 17 recommendations, including the introduction of a legislated ‘minimum set of transparency requirements, enforceable with fines’, which, if repeatedly not met, can lead to a platform being banned by the Minister of Home Affairs as a last resort. Among others, these requirements involve an obligatory presence in Australia, the proactive labelling of state affiliated media and the disclosure of any government directions they receive and any changes to their data collection practices.

Other recommendations include: extending the Protective Security Policy Framework directive to ban WeChat on federal government devices, establishing a national security technology office within the Department of Home Affairs, and clarifying that Magnitsky-style cyber sanctions (Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011) can be applied to cyber-enabled foreign interference actors. Promoting the digital literacy and the infrastructure of developing countries in the Indo-Pacific was a further suggestion. This last recommendation coincides with recent reports about China’s attempts to buy favourable press in Palau and the Solomon Islands.

Apart from Australian concerns, the report also looks at international developments, including in the EU, the US, Canada, the UK, New Zealand and the Pacific region, stating that ‘foreign interference, through social media and other methods, is an issue affecting liberal democracies around the world’.

Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media

Report

TikTok and WeChat respond to claims they are biggest national security threat to Australia

A committee investigating the use of social media as a means of foreign interference in Australia has found that applications TikTok and WeChat could be the country’s biggest security risks.

Social media giants on notice over foreign cyber threat

Social media giants have been put on notice that they should make themselves more transparent and subject to Australian laws or face large fines or even bans.

TikTok ban on Australian government devices should also cover WeChat, parliamentary committee recommends

Senate committee examining foreign interference on social media says it is ‘concerned’ with ‘unique national security risks’ the companies pose

Australia must de-weaponise TikTok and WeChat

A bipartisan report has made 17 recommendations – based on the liberal tradition of transparency, not censorship – to make Australia a harder target for malicious actors to interfere in our democracy through social media apps.

Subscribe to The Australian | Newspaper home delivery, website, iPad, iPhone & Android apps

Subscribe to The Australian to get unrestricted digital access, home paper delivery, Apps for iPad and Android, member only +Rewards and much more…

‘A Chinese state party propaganda rag’: Beijing is trying to buy influence in Pacific media

Recent investigations reveal how Beijing has been looking to increase its influence in the Pacific by using political pressure and funding to capture local elites and media, with questions raised around the independence of outlets that have cut deals with China.

The post Foreign Interference Through Social Media appeared first on Periscope.

18 July 2023

…Was the title of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s pre-travel media release for his recent Europe visit. It listed two main agenda items: meeting with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to ‘discuss deepening cooperation between Australia and Germany in a range of areas including trade and investment, the clean energy transition, and defence’ and advocating for this ‘region’s strategic priorities and [advancing] Australia’s security, economic and trade agenda’ at the NATO Leaders’ Summit. In addition, Albanese used the occasion to push for greater efforts to overcome the current obstacles to the successful conclusion of an EU-Australia FTA.

It was a busy few days for Albanese, who began his Europe trip with his first official visit to Germany on 10 July before joining fellow IP4 partners New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea at the NATO summit in Vilnius on 11-12 July. Overall, it turned out to be quite a positive visit for the Australian PM.

In Germany, he and Chancellor Scholz announced that the two countries were planning to work together even more closely in areas concerning ‘economic security, diversification and resilient supply chains’ and on resolving the current stalemate of the EU-Australia FTA negotiations. Albanese further stated that Australia had officially joined the ‘Climate Club’, an initiative formed by the German Chancellor in 2022, with the aim to decarbonise industry and reach net zero emissions by 2050. Other members of the Climate Club currently are the USA, the UK, Canada, France and Italy.

Apart from trade and climate action, another big subject of the bilateral meetings in Germany was defence, both in a bilateral context as well as in relation to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Having discussed armament, Albanese and Scholz confirmed a $1bn (AUD) deal for Germany to buy 100 Boxer Heavy Weapon Carriers from Australia, the majority of which will be built in Queensland, at the Rheinmetall Centre of Excellence, with a small remainder to be built in Germany. Deliveries are scheduled to start in 2025. For Germany this means buying vehicles from a German manufacturer rather than from the US. For Australia, the deal promises to create jobs, although some experts warn that one of the short-term effects might be that it will delay deliveries to the ADF.

Labelled as ‘one of the biggest defence sales in Australia’s history’, the agreement can be seen as yet another step up in German-Australian defence cooperation. In recent years, we have witnessed increased German interest and engagement in the Pacific region and Australia is considered a significant partner in Germany’s Pacific strategy. Since the rather symbolic first visit of a German frigate to the region in 2021, there has been increased German participation in joint defence exercises. After having sent a contingent of 13 aircraft to participate in Operations Pitch Black and Kakadu in 2022, this month, up to 240 German soldiers will be joining the Australia-US-led Talisman Sabre exercise.

Another defence-related announcement made during Albanese’s Germany visit concerned the conflict in Ukraine. Australia committed to making a contribution to air surveillance by deploying an E7-A Wedgetail Air Force jet, including 100 crew and support personnel, from Germany’s Ramstein base for the duration of six months starting in October 2023.

From Germany Albanese travelled to Vilnius, where he was expected to confirm Australia’s continued commitment to a rules-based international order and ‘urge the United States and China to manage their increasingly tense competition responsibly’, warning that ‘great-power rivalry in Australia’s region needs diplomatic mechanisms to avoid spiralling into conflict’.
He held one-on-one meetings with NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and the leaders of France, Great Britain, Lithuania, Portugal and Denmark, among others, as well as a series of informal meetings with other European leaders.

Stoltenberg stressed that NATO’s relationship with Australia was ‘a partnership we really value’ and thanked the PM for Australia’s ongoing support for Ukraine. At the same time, he assured Albanese that ‘what happens in the Indo-Pacific matters for Europe, for NATO’ as ‘security is not regional, security is global’. This message would have been welcomed by Albanese as confirmation that NATO has taken on board Australia’s message of the significance of Indo-Pacific developments to European interests.

A big item on the agenda for the European meetings were the EU-Australia FTA negotiations, with the recent round of talks once again stalled by disagreements over the volume of agricultural products Australia would be allowed to export and geographical indications of products (GIs). In his meeting with President Macron, Albanese made it clear that although Australia was very much interested in successfully concluding the FTA, it would not ‘sign up to a deal for the sake of it’. It is safe to say that the EU does not intend to do that either, especially when it comes to GIs.

The PM also caught up with US President Biden, US Congress representatives and Senators, reaffirming the importance of AUKUS and reiterating Australia’s need for the support for the US legislation required to allow Australia to work within the AUKUS framework. The announcement on the weekend that the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee is backing an amendment in legislation that will grant Australia a 20-year exemption from the otherwise strict export rules, appears to imply that the meetings went well.

In press conferences and doorstep interviews during the summit, Albanese stated that the NATO summit was ‘an important forum for Australia to be represented’ and that, due to the interconnectedness of the world, ‘Australia must be engaged and have a seat at the table’. He further concluded that ‘attending a conference like this gives a real opportunity to advance Australia’s interests because of who is present’ and he appears to have used his opportunity to spruik Australia’s interests.

Advancing Australia’s interests with Germany and NATO | Prime Minister of Australia

Remarks to the Australia Germany business reception | Prime Minister of Australia

It’s a pleasure to be in Berlin on my first official visit as Prime Minister.

Press conference – Berlin, Germany | Prime Minister of Australia

Transcript – Joint press statements | Prime Minister of Australia

OLAF SCHOLZ, CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY: I am delighted to be able to welcome you to the German Capital on your first official visit. Especially in times like these, we can see how important it is to closely exchange with partners, also with partners that are half a world away, if you will, like our frie…

‘Never been closer’: Australia and Germany strengthen ties

The prime minister boosts Australia’s climate, trade and defence cooperation with Germany during a meeting with Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

Germans join Australian war games in regional defence boost

The PM refused to be drawn on the Keating-Macron opposition to a NATO push into the Indo-Pacific, and committed a surveillance plane to Ukraine’s defence.

PM seals $1b defence export deal with Berlin

Anthony Albanese sealed the deal to export 100 Boxer fighting vehicles as he arrives in Germany for a NATO meeting that’s split over its role in Asia.

Anthony Albanese announces $1bn defence deal with Germany before Nato talks

Berlin to buy 100 Boxer heavy weapon carriers made in Brisbane by German manufacturer Rheinmetall

What’s behind Australia’s $1 billion defence deal with Germany?

The major deal for Boxer armored fighting vehicles matters to both Australia and Germany individually – and also to the countries’ growing relationship.

Why Australia, Germany could have a meeting of minds on China

Anthony Albanese and Olaf Scholz could well be converging onto a common position on the China challenge – they’re just starting from different places.

Why has Australia signed up to Germany’s Climate Club and what difference will it make?

Australia has agreed to join the German-led Climate Club. What is the club and will it make any difference to the nation’s climate goals?

Building Indo-Pacific security at NATO’s Vilnius summit | The Strategist

NATO’s 2022 Madrid summit marked a shift to taking a truly global approach to strategic competition by including Indo-Pacific regional partners as participants for the first time. The presence of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and…

Australia’s message for NATO | The Strategist

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese heads to Vilnius for this week’s NATO summit needing to deliver the clear messages that Australia continues to be a serious supporter of Ukraine, that it remains of free will when…

Europe would be ‘cheering’ on Australian fighter jets sent to Ukraine, according to NATO host

Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has been invited to join crucial talks in Lithuania, after $110 million in military and humanitarian support for Ukraine.

What happens in Indo-Pacific matters to Europe, says NATO boss

The PM will upgrade Australia’s ties with NATO at the leaders’ summit as the security alliance grapples with the twin challenges posed by China and Russia.

Albanese presses Macron to allow EU trade deal

Anthony Albanese will prevail upon Emmanuel Macron overnight on Tuesday to stop blocking a conclusion of a free trade agreement with the EU.

The post ‘Advancing Australia’s Interests with Germany and NATO’… appeared first on Periscope.

28 April 2023

On Monday, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Defence Minister Richard Marles delivered the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) Announcement, releasing the public parts of the DSR, the government’s DSR response and the National Defence Statement 2023.

The Albanese Government commissioned the DSR in its first 100 days in office, with the aim to ‘assess whether Australia had the necessary defence capability, posture and preparedness to best defend Australia and its interests in the strategic environment we now face’. Hailed as the ‘most ambitious review of Defence posture and structure since WWII’, its results are expected to have a significant impact on Australia’s strategic policy and Defence resourcing and planning over the next years.

The result in a nutshell: The Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) ‘current force structure is not fit for [the] current strategic circumstances’ and urgently has to change. ‘Intense China-US competition is the defining feature’ of the region and additional existential threats like climate change will only increase the challenges facing Australia and Defence in coming years.

The report starts by setting out the current strategic circumstances and defence environment on the basis of which recommendations are being made. Building on the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, the DSR makes the point that the preparation time for any potential conflict is reducing, meaning that defence planning can no longer allow itself a ten-year window for the implementation of capability-building projects. Instead, the DSR identifies three specific planning periods for Defence: 2023-2025, 2026-2030 and the period 2031 onwards. The ADF would also have to shift from the current threefold ‘balanced force’ focus, i.e. defending the continent, regional engagement, and contributions as a ‘good global citizen’, to a ‘focused force’ approach, including five main tasks: the defence of the nation, deterrence through denial, protection of economic connections, cooperating with regional partners and supporting the rules-based global order.

The review further states that ‘the risks of military escalation or miscalculation are rising’ and that the current circumstances require a whole-of-nation effort rather than narrowly defined defence targets. Australia’s traditional notion of the ‘Defence of Australia’ concept, therefore, needs to be replaced by a ‘new strategic conceptual approach of National Defence’, which requires ‘much more active Australian statecraft’ in order to help maintain a regional balance of power. This includes the continued centrality of Australia’s alliance with the United States as well as investing in regional architecture and Indo-Pacific regional partnerships and expanding relationships and practical cooperation with key powers such as Japan and India.

In their DSR announcement, Albanese and Marles highlighted that the government had identified six key priorities for immediate action based on the review’s recommendations:

• The acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS to improve deterrence capabilities;
• Developing the ADF’s ability to precisely strike targets at longer-range and manufacture munitions in Australia;
• Improving the ADF’s ability to operate from Australia’s northern bases;
• Initiatives to improve the growth and retention of a highly skilled Defence workforce;
• Lifting capacity to rapidly translate disruptive new technologies into ADF capability, in close partnership with Australian industry; and
• Deepening of diplomatic and defence partnerships with key partners in the Indo-Pacific

In relation to these priorities, the government has stressed that they would make ‘the hard decisions necessary to cancel or reprioritise Defence projects or activities that are no longer suited to our strategic circumstances’.

In practice this means the continued implementation of the AUKUS submarine deal, cuts to Army’s land projects, i.e. a reduction in armoured vehicles and cancellation of a second regiment of self-propelled howitzer guns in favour of long-range missiles and new landing craft, more investment in the Northern bases in Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, increased incentives for recruitment and the retention of skilled workforce, investment into manufacturing and companies with ‘disruptive’ technologies, and enhanced cooperation with partners in the region, including more resources for DFAT. All of which will involve a significant financial commitment.

The Albanese government this week has already pledged $19 billion for the implementation of the review’s recommendations, $3.8 of which have been allocated to northern Australia’s defence infrastructure. As the review urges the government to commit more money to Defence, while the government says it will keep the budget broadly unchanged, we can expect more cancellation of projects the government identifies as redundant. Which projects will be cut will be determined by two further reviews, conducted over the next twelve months.

The DSR also addresses another question that has been much discussed of late, namely the role of the military in the context of natural disasters. The verdict: state and local governments need to stop relying on the military and develop independent solutions and capabilities to ‘deal with all but the most extreme domestic disasters’. ‘Defence must be the force of last resort of domestic aid to the civil community. This is critical, given the urgent geostrategic risks that the nation faces, and the need for the ADF to be in a position to respond to regional contingencies.’. Prime Minister Albanese conceded that the broader issues related to climate impact would have to be considered and that ‘as a government and as a nation’ there was a need to ‘work out an appropriate response’. Shadow Minister for Defence Andrew Hastie agreed that alternatives had to be explored, as ‘the primary mission of the ADF is to win wars.’ But Hastie also criticised the government’s DSR announcement, stating that the timing of the announcement a day before ANZAC Day was intended as a ‘smokescreen to hide the truth about […] delays to strategic direction, the deferral of spending, and the cannibalising of [the army’s] capability’.

He was not the only critic. Hugh White, co-author of the 2000 Defence White Paper, noted that the announced structural changes were ‘extremely modest’ and any commitment of ‘funding beyond the four-year forward estimate period meaningless’. Peter Jennings, Director of Strategic Analysis Australia, criticised that there appears to be ‘no coherent plan for what the army should be doing’. Others remarked that, in contrast to the US and Japanese defence strategies, the Australian DSR ‘makes very little mention of more specific threats posed by China’, denying ‘a full understanding of the strategic factors driving the need for the fundamental changes described in the report’. Regarding this latter point, it is safe to assume that the confidential version of the DSR holds a more elaborate section on China, but the public version does note that China’s military ‘build-up is occurring without transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific region of China’s strategic intent’ and that its ‘assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea threatens the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific in a way that adversely impacts Australia’s national interests’. This has not gone unnoticed, with Beijing accusing the DSR of ‘hyping up concerns about Xi Jinping’s regime’.

Regardless of the criticisms, the fact remains that the DSR findings will lead to a significant re-evaluation of Defence structure and planning. With a number of recent cancellations of Defence projects, it will be interesting to see what concrete changes and budget-re-shuffling measures the next months will bring.

National Defence: Defence Strategic Review 2023 | About | Defence

Commissioned by the Prime Minister, an independent review of Australian Defence Force force posture.

Release of the Defence Strategic Review | Prime Minister of Australia

Today the Albanese Government has released the public version of the Defence Strategic Review (the Review), the Government’s response to the Review, and the National Defence Statement 2023.

Press Conference – Parliament House, Canberra | Prime Minister of Australia

ANTHONY ALBANESE, PRIME MINISTER: Thanks very much for joining us. We’re here today to launch the Defence Strategic Review which we’ll be releasing an unclassified version of here today. And I’m joined today of course by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Minister for Defence In…

The much-anticipated defence review is here. So what does it say, and what does it mean for Australia?

‘The risks of military escalation or miscalculation are rising’, according to the long-awaited report.

Review demands dramatic pivot by Defence Department

Australia’s new National Defence posture will require co-ordination between defence and civil agencies across all tiers of government.

Australia must be able to defend itself at a distance

At the core of the review of the country’s defence strategy is the idea that Australia must no longer just rely on geography to protect from threats, it must project military power into the region.

How life for an Australian soldier is about to change

The army will come to look more like the US Marines, tasked with landing on beaches and capturing a foothold in hostile territory.

The winners and losers in the defence shake-up

The biggest review of the country’s defence strategy in 35 years says the Defence Force is not fit for purpose. Its far-reaching proposals won’t please everyone.

Defence strategic review: Australia will build longer range military power amid ‘radically different’ security environment

Government considers establishment of domestic manufacturing as review warns Australia’s military capability structured for ‘a bygone era’

Five things you need to know about how the defence strategic review changes Australia’s military priorities

Review says the ADF is not ‘fully fit for purpose’ and suggests ways to counter new threats in our region

Defence Review: DFAT gets a boost

For the first time, a major Defence policy statement recommends more diplomatic funding.

The defence review says Australia is at little risk of a land invasion – but that’s not where the threats end

Fears of direct military invasion are too narrow a frame to get a true picture of the Indo-Pacific’s security outlook, report argues

Defence review pulls no punches: China the biggest threat we face

Rejecting vague language about rising tensions, the former defence chief and defence minister call out just one nation for threatening Australia’s core interests.

Billions to fast-track local missile production in defence shake-up

Factories to produce missiles, a more potent navy and faster decisions on buying new weapons will feature as part of a major military review.

Federal budget to allocate $4bn for long-range missiles and Australian production of key weapons

Defence minister says army’s artillery range will ‘grow from 40km to in excess of 500km’

Stop using army for floods and fires, defence review says

Increased use of the military to help with natural disaster relief is detracting from its ability to defend Australia, the Defence Strategic Review says.

Reliance on Australia’s military during natural disasters comes at a cost, senator says

Climate change and humanitarian crisis are calling on too many ADF resources which should be reserved for conflict, Tony Sheldon says

The most significant defence review in 40 years positions Australia for complex threats in a changing region

Australia will once again focus on defending its coastline, while also doubling down on its alliance with the US and recognising the threats posed by climate change.

Northern Australia poised for influx of soldiers and spending in nation’s new ‘missile age’

It was on the frontline in World War II, and now officials say Australia’s north will once again be key for the nation’s future defences.

The Defence Strategic Review: a revolution in Australian defence planning? | The Strategist

Public discussion of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) has focused on the announced changes to major capability programs. On that score, the statement by Defence Minister Richard Marles that the DSR is ’the most ambitious…

Defence review warns Australia is not ready to ward off a major attacker | The Strategist

The government has accepted sweeping recommendations in a review of Australia’s strategic position and the military capabilities it needs to defend itself, with the main focus on building deterrence through the ability to…

Defence Strategic Review: Strong chords, with one jarring note

A promising strategy, but is there tension with AUKUS?

Labor’s $4b missile plan under fire

The Albanese government will pour more than $4 billion into urgently building up stockpiles of missiles, artillery shells and sea mines, including establishing local production.

Defence review’s a good beginning, but lacks a middle and an end

The defence review lays out the “profound” risks facing Australia. But questions remain about how we will protect and defend ourselves over the next decade and beyond.

Defence Strategic Review updates LIVE: ANZAC day a ‘smokescreen’ for Labor’s defence shake-up, Opposition defence spokesman Andrew Hastie says

Opposition defence spokesman Andrew Hastie says Labor has just shifted costs, not bolstered defence; Prime Minister Anthony Albanese says Australia cannot wait “for the future to shape us”. How the day unfolded.

China accuses Australia of ‘hyping up’ military threat

A spokeswoman responded to the Strategic Defence Review, saying China’s military build-up is “defensive in nature” and poses no threat to others.

Australian army chief urges soldiers to adapt amid dispute over Labor’s defence overhaul

Lt Gen Simon Stuart says troops will face ‘opportunities and challenges’ but shadow defence minister says army will be weakened by changes

The post Pivots and Shake-Ups – The Australian Defence Strategic Review appeared first on Periscope.